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ABSTRACT  
 
AUTOPSY OF THE BANKING CRISIS: EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF  
DIRECTOR CHARACTERISTICS ON BANK FAILURES 
by 
Gregory L. Prescott  
 
 
The catastrophic impact of the recent financial crisis on the banking industry 
reverberated throughout the United States and had contagion effects worldwide. 
Congressional inquiries, media scrutiny, and the public alleged failure of the boards of 
directors to effectively discharge their governance responsibilities. The objective of this 
study was to investigate how certain characteristics of directors on a bank‘s board are 
related to bank failure—specifically whether the presence of directors with banking 
industry–specific experience and accounting expertise is related to a bank‘s likelihood of 
failure. The study also examined how board director tenure is related to bank failure.  
I employed a matched-pairs design of 65 failed and 65 nonfailed U.S. commercial 
banks between 2008 and 2011. Matching was based on age, size, and geographic 
markets. Logistic regression was used to analyze the hypothesized associations. 
At the board level, I found a statistically significant and negative association 
between director tenure and bank failure, supporting the resource dependence 
perspective. I found no significant association between bank work or bank director 
experience and bank failure. At the audit committee level, I found positive and significant 
relationships among bank work experience, bank director experience, and bank failure, 
suggesting overconfidence among audit committee members. Results for accounting 
 viii 
expertise indicated that presence of a director on the audit committee that previously 
worked as a chief financial officer, vice president of finance, or controller without a CPA 
designation (POTACCTG) was significant and negatively associated with bank failure. 
The average tenure of audit committee members was negatively and significantly 
associated with bank failure, and the interactions between tenure and the two categories 
of accounting expertise were also negatively and significantly related to bank failure. 
Together, these results provide support for the expertise hypothesis: As directors gain 
industry- and bank-specific knowledge during their tenure, they are able to provide more 
effective oversight and prevent their banks from failing.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
  
The objective of this study is to investigate how select characteristics of directors 
on a bank‘s board and its audit committee are related to the bank‘s likelihood of failure. 
According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 413 commercial banks 
failed
1
 in the United States and Puerto Rico from January 2008 through the end of 2011.
2
 
However, the number of bank failures does not fully convey the magnitude of the 
banking crisis. These bank failures wiped out more than $17 billion of market 
capitalization of the publicly owned banks and more than $12 billion of balance sheet 
equity for the private banks.
3
 Moreover, the failures cost the FDIC‘s Deposit Insurance 
Fund $86.9 billion (FDIC Annual Reports, 2010, 2011).  
These costs, however, do not include the substantial societal costs associated with 
financial crises. In their study of the effects of financial crises in both developed and 
emerging market countries, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) note that the economic costs of 
financial crises tend to be severe and prolonged. Specifically, the authors report that on a 
peak-to-trough basis, ―real housing price declines average 35 percent stretched out over 
six years, while equity price collapses average 55 percent over a downturn of about three 
                                                          
1
A bank failure is defined by the FDIC as the ―closing of a bank by a federal or state banking regulatory 
agency. Generally, a bank is closed when it is unable to meet its obligations to depositors and others‖ 
(http://www.fdic.gov/consumers/banking/facts/). This is the definition of bank failure adopted in this study.  
2
See the Failed Bank List available at http://www.fdic.gov.  
3
For the failed public banks, market capitalization was calculated by multiplying the stock‘s high price for 
the fourth quarter of 2006 by the number of outstanding shares as of 12/31/2006. For the failed private 
banks, stockholders‘ equity was obtained for each bank as of 12/31/2006 from the Federal Financial 
Institutions Examination Council website at https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/.  
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and a half years,‖ the unemployment rate rises an average of 7 percentage points during 
the down cycle, and government debt tends to explode, ―rising an average of 86 percent 
in the major post-World War II episodes‖ (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009, p. 3). Although their 
report was published in January 2009—well before the scale of the crisis in the United 
States was known—it is beyond contention that the recent banking crisis resulted in 
housing prices declining sharply, stock market indices losing significant amounts of 
market capitalization, high and persistent levels of unemployment, and an unprecedented 
ballooning of the federal budget deficit. The economic ramifications of bank failures 
persist even today as banks have become more rigid in making loans in a bid to avoid 
aggressive risk taking (Federal Reserve System Board of Governors, 2010). Moreover, 
the crisis related to banks is not over. In May 2012, JPMorgan Chase reported a trading 
loss that at the time was estimated at up to $9 billion (JPMorgan Chase & Co., 2012; 
Silver-Greenberg & Craig, 2012), prompting immediate congressional action in the form 
of a U.S. Senate Banking Committee hearing in which the bank‘s chief executive officer 
(CEO), Jamie Dimon, was grilled over the obvious failure of the bank‘s risk management 
system (Goldfarb, 2012). According to the firm‘s 2012 annual report to stockholders, the 
trading loss eventually resulted in a $6.25 billion charge against earnings for that year.  
Congressional inquiries into bank failures and media reports suggest that one of 
the factors that potentially contributed to the bank failures was ineffective oversight on 
the part of the internal watchdog, a bank‘s board of directors. Shortly after the initial 
phase of the banking crisis, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced 
plans ―to look into whether the boards of banks and other financial firms conducted 
effective oversight leading up to the financial crisis‖ (Goldfarb, 2009, p. D1), part of a 
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broader effort on the part of the SEC to intensify scrutiny of the top levels of 
management and to give new powers to shareholders to shape boards.  
However, we do not know if the failure of a bank‘s board of directors is a 
contributing factor to the recent bank failures because of the lack of research. Over the 
last three decades, researchers have directed substantial attention to characteristics of 
boards of directors and their potential impact on firm performance (see Bebchuk & 
Weisbach, 2010; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & 
Ellstrand, 1999; Finegold, Benson, & Hecht, 2007; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). The findings 
of this literature remain mixed and inconclusive. Despite the vital role of commercial 
banks in the United States and international economic systems, there is considerably less 
academic research on the governance policies and board structures in the banking 
industry (Adams & Mehran, 2003; Macey & O‘Hara, 2003). The limited bank-related 
studies reviewed later provide ambiguous and equivocal results; some show that board 
independence is not related to bank performance (e.g., Sierra, Talmor, & Wallace, 2006), 
whereas others show that CEO duality (where the CEO is also the chairman of the board) 
is positively related to bank performance (e.g., Simpson & Gleason, 1999). Some of the 
inconsistency of the findings of these studies may be attributable to differing approaches 
in measuring performance (Dalton et al., 1998; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Accounting-based 
measures have been criticized as being subject to manipulation by management through 
accounting choices and for lacking standardization in the handling of international 
accounting conventions. While many researchers consider market-based measures of 
performance superior to accounting-based measures, they are often subject to forces 
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beyond the control of management and directors. An advantage of the current study is 
that it focuses on bank failure, an unambiguous and objective measure of performance.
4
  
Additionally, no research has examined director characteristics in relation to the 
recent bank failures, which some researchers have characterized as resulting from 
excessive risk-taking by banks (Peni & Vähämaa, 2012). Echoing this sentiment, Federal 
Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke attributed the financial crisis, in part, to ―significant 
defects in … risk management and risk controls‖ (Bernanke, 2010, p. 7). Furthermore, 
the deficiencies in risk management were not limited to large financial institutions. 
According to Bernanke, ―risk-management weaknesses were spread throughout the 
financial system, including at many institutions that were neither large nor too-big-to-fail. 
For example, problems with commercial real estate lending were concentrated in regional 
and community banks‖ (Bernanke, 2010, p. 7). 
Therefore, the objective of this study is to investigate how characteristics of 
directors on a bank‘s board are related to the likelihood of bank failure. Specifically, the 
study examines how the presence of directors with banking industry–specific experience 
and accounting-based human capital on a bank‘s board is related to the likelihood of bank 
failure. The study also examines how directors with bank-specific knowledge gained 
through longer service (tenure) on a bank‘s board are related to bank failure. These 
director characteristics are also examined at the audit committee level because the audit 
committee is responsible for overseeing the risks related to financial reporting which, as 
the banking crisis demonstrates, did not adequately reflect the risks undertaken by bank 
management. 
                                                          
4
It must also be acknowledged that bank failure has the disadvantage of being a rather extreme measure of 
poor performance. 
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To execute the study consistent with prior bank failure research (Espahbodi, 1991; 
Lane, Looney, & Wansley, 1986; Meyer & Pifer, 1970), a matched-pairs design is 
adopted using a sample of U.S. commercial bank failures between 2008 and 2011. A 
matched-pairs design is appropriate because of the need to hand-collect most of the data 
required for the empirical analyses. For example, data on director characteristics need to 
be hand-collected from proxy statements filed with the SEC. As bank failure is a 
dichotomous variable, the study will use a logistic regression technique to model the 
likelihood of bank failure on director and audit committee member attributes while 
controlling for a number of other factors (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). 
This study makes several important contributions. Given the magnitude of the 
financial, economic, social, and psychological impacts of the recent financial crisis, this 
study provides a timely and first examination of the role of corporate governance in the 
recent bank failures. Regulators, media, and the public have criticized banks‘ boards of 
directors for failing in their fiduciary duties (Pozen, 2010). This study provides initial 
evidence to such claims and helps inform regulators with future policy formulations. 
Specifically, my findings indicate there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between directors possessing previous bank work experience and bank 
failure—at both the board level as well as the audit committee level. These results call 
into question the practice of banks having directors with previous bank work experience 
on their boards and suggests a level of expert overconfidence and cognitive 
entrenchment. Furthermore, by themselves, neither category of accounting expertise of 
interest in this study—work as a CPA or in public accounting or work as a chief financial 
officer, vice president of finance, or controller—was a significant deterrent to bank 
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failure at the board level, but work experience as a chief financial officer, vice president 
of finance, or controller was negative and significantly related to bank failure at the audit 
committee level.  
Some of the most interesting findings of the current study relate to director tenure. 
As the average tenure of a bank‘s directors grew, the bank‘s likelihood of failure was 
significantly diminished. Moreover, when average board tenure was interacted with bank 
work experience and the two categories of accounting expertise studied here, the 
interaction between average board tenure and bank work experience and the interaction 
between average tenure and potential accounting expertise were negative and statistically 
significant in relation to bank failure. These findings lend support to the rationale behind 
the expertise hypothesis: Directors who have served for a greater number of years are 
more likely to have gained substantial necessary knowledge over time, and thus are in a 
better position to carry out their fiduciary responsibilities to stockholders and to provide 
necessary oversight of senior management than directors with shorter board service.  
This study contributes to the corporate governance academic literature in several 
ways. First, it investigates the role of corporate governance in commercial banks, which 
are financial pillars of society. Our understanding of the role of corporate boards in a 
highly regulated but vital industry is hindered by the relatively limited and relevant 
research (Adams & Mehran, 2003; Macey & O‘Hara, 2003). The banking industry 
typically has been excluded from prior governance research on grounds that it is 
regulated and has unique requirements that render banks less homogeneous than 
industrial companies. The implications of the catastrophic and recent bank failures 
suggest that the role of directors in the banking industry should not be ignored but instead 
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investigated. Second, this study examines how board and audit committee characteristics 
such as banking experience, accounting expertise, and tenure are related to bank failure. 
Prior research on board characteristics and bankruptcy has tended to focus on board 
independence, board size, and board composition (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Gales & 
Kesner, 1994). Therefore, the current study extends the rather limited body of literature 
on board characteristics and bankruptcy. Furthermore, no prior study in the banking 
industry could be identified examining the role of a director‘s industry-specific 
experience and accounting expertise in relation to either bank performance or bank 
failure. Therefore, this study contributes to the bank failure literature. 
A third contribution of the current study is that it adds to the growing body of 
literature on accounting expertise that has taken on additional significance since the 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and its requirement that a company‘s 
audit committee include at least one ―financial expert‖ or disclose the reasons for not 
having such an individual. In light of the fact that the SEC adopted a broad definition of 
financial expertise when it developed the rules implementing the SOX requirement 
(Dhaliwal, Naiker, & Navissi, 2010), several researchers have subsequently investigated 
whether or not the type of financial expertise represented on the audit committee impacts 
market perceptions (DeFond, Hann, & Hu, 2005), accounting conservatism (Krishnan & 
Visvanathan, 2008), internal control quality (Krishnan, 2005), financial restatements 
(Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2004), and accruals quality (Dhaliwal et al., 2010). Yet, 
commercial banks and other financial institutions often have been excluded from these 
studies‘ samples (Abbott et al., 2004; DeFond et al., 2005; Dhaliwal et al., 2010; 
Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008). As a result, there is relatively little empirical evidence 
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on the relationship between accounting expertise and bank performance. The current 
study addresses this void.  
This study also contributes to the literature on audit committee effectiveness in a 
different way. While previous research links audit committees to various measures of 
financial reporting quality (Abbott et al., 2004; Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Krishnan & 
Visvanathan, 2008), none has examined the potential role audit committee directors can 
play in relation to firm performance, and specifically, no study has investigated the 
association between audit committees and firm failures. Various risk management 
surveys and white papers document the important role audit committees can and should 
play in relation to risk management from not only the financial reporting perspective but 
also a strategic perspective (Beasley, 2010; COSO, 2010). The results suggest that 
directors with a CPA on the audit committee are not effective in preventing bank failure, 
but directors possessing experience as a CFO, controller, or similar senior executive 
accounting position are more beneficial in relation to bank failure. One explanation for 
this finding is that directors with a CPA designation may be focused on complying with 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and other bank reporting regulations, 
whereas non-CPA accounting experts bring greater and broader perspective in relation to 
bank performance. 
Another contribution is that the current study employs an observable and 
objective outcome—bank failure—rather than relying on the much-criticized accounting- 
and market-based measures of firm performance used in most prior studies on firm 
performance and director characteristics. Market-based measures (e.g., stock prices) tend 
to respond to news, events, and economic developments that are not necessarily a direct 
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consequence of directors‘ actions. Accounting-based performance measures are 
predicated on a myriad of management choices and assumptions. Evaluating performance 
against such measures can be subjective. However, evaluating a bank‘s performance 
using failure provides a more objective analysis as the performance outcome is known 
(failed or not failed).  
Finally, previous research on director characteristics and firm performance has 
tended to focus on large corporations—Fortune 500, S&P 500, and Forbes 500 
companies—in part because of data availability (Dalton et al., 1998; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). Yet, few of those studies have controlled for interindustry differences (Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989). By focusing on the commercial banking industry in the United States 
during the four-year period in question, the study‘s sample comprises commercial banks 
with relatively homogeneous operational characteristics—thereby helping to control for 
unspecified factors that can threaten a study‘s internal validity (Sierra et al., 2006). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Guided by theory in the areas 
of resource dependence and experience-based human capital, in the next section I review 
the relevant literature and develop testable hypotheses. The third section outlines the 
research method, including a description of the sample, an explanation of the study‘s 
variables, and discussion of the statistical technique used to analyze the data. The fourth 
section includes the results of the logistic regression tests of the study‘s hypotheses. The 
final section includes a discussion of the study‘s main findings, highlights the primary 
limitations of the study, and discusses avenues for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 In this section, I briefly review select studies on the association between board 
composition and firm performance, including bankruptcy. Next, I turn my attention to 
literature on the relationship between board composition and bank performance, and the 
association between board composition and bank failure. I use both the resource 
dependence and human capital perspectives throughout this discussion. As there are no 
previous studies on directors‘ industry experience or their accounting/financial expertise 
in relation to bank performance or bank failure, I draw on the audit firm industry 
specialization and audit committee literature to develop my hypotheses.  
 In their widely cited work on boards of directors and corporate financial 
performance, Zahra and Pearce (1989) indicate that much of that research has been 
guided by four distinct theoretical perspectives: the resource dependence view, the 
legalistic perspective, the class hegemony view, and agency theory. From a resource 
dependence perspective, an organization‘s success is dependent upon its ability to acquire 
scarce and essential resources (Pfeffer, 1972; Ulrich & Barney, 1984), such as knowledge 
and capital. Thus, boards of directors are viewed as providing vital resources or helping 
their firms secure essential resources through linkages to the external environment (Gales 
& Kesner, 1994; Pfeffer, 1972) that might otherwise be unattainable, thereby enhancing 
company performance. In fact, Zahra and Pearce report that compared with the legalistic 
11 
 
 
perspective, class hegemony, and agency theory, there is strong empirical support for the 
resource dependence view when investigating the relationship between boards and 
company performance.  
Boards of Directors and Firm Performance 
It is not surprising that the impact of directors on their firms‘ financial 
performance has been the focus of much attention from the academic community. 
Moreover, in recent years a number of corporate governance reforms aimed at boards of 
directors and subcommittees of the board have been enacted by the U.S. Congress (for 
example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) and by national stock exchanges (the 
NASDAQ and the NYSE). Finegold et al. (2007) provide a comprehensive review of the 
academic research on corporate boards and firm performance by extending Zahra and 
Pearce (1989).  
In their review, Finegold et al. (2007) include empirical studies published in the 
main peer-reviewed journals after 1989, the final year covered by Zahra and Pearce 
(1989). Finegold et al. identify 105 studies and organize their review around the 
following topics: duality in the board structure, insider-outsider ratio in the board 
structure, size and stability of the board structure, equity ownership of board members, 
director rewards, and shareholder activism and corporate governance ratings. They 
conclude that the extant literature on the subject provides little evidence of a systematic 
relationship between these various board characteristics and firm performance. However, 
the authors note that one meta-analysis of 27 studies that featured a board size variable 
found that having more directors was associated with higher levels of firm performance, 
12 
 
 
and that overall, the majority of studies on shareholder activism and firm performance 
report some positive impact.  
Boards of directors and firm bankruptcy have been the focus of less academic 
attention. Two studies that examine this issue were published in 1994. Gales and Kesner 
(1994) use a matched-pairs design to examine a sample of 127 bankrupt and 127 
nonbankrupt firms. The researchers conclude the following: (a) in the two-year period 
before a bankruptcy declaration, the boards of firms that filed bankruptcy were 
significantly smaller than their nonbankrupt counterparts; (b) bankrupt firms had 
significantly fewer outsiders on their boards in the two-year period preceding the 
bankruptcy declaration; (c) there was no significant difference in the number of outsiders 
on boards of bankrupt and nonbankrupt firms at the time of bankruptcy filing; and (d) 
bankrupt firms engaged in more changes to their boards than the nonbankrupt firms in the 
two years following bankruptcy. Daily and Dalton (1994) employ logistic regression to 
analyze certain corporate governance policies of 57 large U.S. firms that declared 
bankruptcy between 1972 and 1982 and 57 surviving matched firms. The researchers 
report that bankrupt firms were more likely than the surviving firms to have a CEO who 
also served as the chairman of the board and to have a higher proportion of affiliated 
directors. The researchers also report a significant and positive interaction between these 
two governance structures in distinguishing between the bankrupt and surviving firms.  
Boards of Directors and Bank Financial Performance 
There is markedly less academic research on the governance policies and board 
structures in the banking industry than for other industries (Adams & Mehran, 2003; 
Macey & O‘Hara, 2003). In examining the relationship between board structure and 
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ownership and financial distress, Simpson and Gleason (1999) analyze data on 287 
publicly traded commercial banks with complete financial and proxy statement 
availability for 1989. They report a lower probability of financial distress when the CEO 
is also the chair of the board, but other governance factors (management and board 
member equity ownership in the bank, board size, the percentage of insiders on the board, 
and CEO equity ownership) were not statistically significant. The researchers controlled 
for book value to total assets, nonperforming assets to total assets, market value per share 
to book value per share, and book value of total equity capital to total assets. Each was 
highly statistically significant (p < .01) except for the ratio of market value to book value 
per share.  
Using a sample of 67 of the 100 largest (in assets) commercial bank holding 
companies
5
 on December 31, 1990 for which pay-performance sensitivity data were 
available and guided by the substitution-monitoring hypothesis, Mishra and Nielsen 
(2000) find that ―a substitution relation exists between pay-related incentives and the 
tenure of independent outside directors relative to the CEO‖ (Mishra & Nielsen, 2000, p. 
65), suggesting that these two variables may be substituted for one another in order to 
maintain bank performance. Overall, the authors report a significant and positive 
relationship between board independence (measured as the percentage of outside 
directors on the board and as the relative tenure of the outside directors in relation to the 
CEO) and bank performance (measured as both return on assets [ROA] and return on 
equity [ROE]). While the study‘s results are reported based on the dependent variable of 
ROA only, the authors indicate they found similar results when ROE was the dependent 
                                                          
5
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council website defines a bank holding company as an 
entity that owns and/or controls one or more U.S. banks or one that owns, or has a controlling interest in, 
one or more banks.  
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variable. Other study variables include size, the ratio of market value to book value, CEO 
pay-related incentives, ownership by inside directors, ownership by outside affiliated 
directors, ownership by outside independent directors, CEO duality, the interaction 
between board independence and CEO pay-related incentives, and the interaction among 
board independence and CEO duality, CEO ownership, CEO tenure, and state takeover 
restrictions. The following variables were statistically significant (p < .05) under both 
board independence measures: percentage ownership by outside affiliated directors, 
percentage ownership by outside independent directors, CEO duality, and the interaction 
of board independence and CEO duality. The market-to-book ratio was significant only 
when board independence was defined as percentage of outside directors, whereas CEO 
pay-related incentives and the interaction of board independence and CEO pay-related 
incentives were statistically significant (p < .05) only when board independence was 
defined as the relative tenure of outside directors in relation to the tenure of the CEO.  
In their study of CEO ownership and the performance of the 100 largest U.S. bank 
holding companies included in Stern Stewart & Co.‘s database for the years 1995–1999, 
Griffith, Fogelberg, and Weeks (2002) use economic measures of bank performance and 
report a nonlinear relationship between CEO ownership and bank performance. The 
authors find that performance improves ―until the CEO‘s holdings reach approximately 
12 percent and then declines until his or her ownership reaches 67 percent‖ of the bank 
(Griffith et al., 2002, p. 182). In attempting to explain their results, the authors suggest 
that due to inadequate diversification of their own investments, CEOs may accept 
suboptimal returns in order to reduce bank-specific risk. The authors do not find an 
association between CEO duality and bank performance. The study‘s economic measures 
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of performance include Economic Value Added (EVA), Market Value Added (MVA), 
and Tobin‘s Q. For measures of ownership and control, the researchers use the following 
variables: CEO duality, CEO tenure, CEO age, the ratio of insiders on the board, the ratio 
of insiders‘ ownership in the holding company to total ownership, and the ratio of the 
CEO‘s ownership to total ownership. After calculating correlation coefficients, the 
authors conclude that only CEO duality and the ratio of CEO‘s ownership to total 
ownership were sufficiently uncorrelated with the other variables to be included in the 
model.
6
 Therefore, the CEO duality variable and the two ownership variables (for 
insiders and the CEO) were retained and the other ownership and control variables were 
dropped. When testing for the significance of CEO duality, the researchers add as 
explanatory variables the log of total assets and the ratio of total loans to total assets; 
these additional test variables had been used as control variables in previous models 
employed in the study. Overall, the study‘s results include a finding that there is a 
significant and negative relationship among CEO ownership and the MVA and Tobin‘s Q 
measures of bank performance; when bank performance is measured as EVA, the authors 
report a significantly positive nonlinear relationship between CEO ownership and 
performance.  
From a sample of 35 bank holding companies over a period from 1959–1999, 
Adams and Mehran (2005) fail to find evidence of a systematic relationship between the 
proportion of outside directors and bank holding company performance.
7
 Contrary to 
                                                          
6
A review of the correlation matrix suggests the authors did not use an established correlation threshold for 
the Pearson Correlations measures in evaluating the potential for multicollinearity and their decision to 
eliminate certain variables. Also, the authors did not report how they made their decisions to eliminate 
variables based on the significance of the correlations between the variables.  
7
The authors initially focus on the period from 19861999, a period associated with increased merger and 
acquisition activity and the widespread adoption of the bank holding company structure in the banking 
industry. In attempting to develop alternative explanations for their results, the authors subsequently extend 
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evidence for nonfinancial firms, the authors did not find a negative relationship between 
board size and bank holding company performance. The following test variables are 
included in the study: board size, fraction of noninsiders on the board, a capital ratio, a 
volatility of stock price measure, total assets, bank holding company organizational 
structure variables (the number of Tier 1 subsidiaries, the number of Tier 1 foreign 
banking subsidiaries, the number of foreign nonbanking subsidiaries, the number of U.S. 
states of Tier 1 subsidiaries, the average number of U.S. subsidiaries per state, and the 
relative size of the lead bank in the holding company), and bank holding company 
performance measures (Tobin‘s Q and ROA). The authors also include the following 
control variables: number of committees, committee members divided by number of 
committees, percentage of committees chaired by outsiders, the average number of 
committees per chair, meetings per year, meeting fees paid to directors, average other 
directorships for outsiders, average other directorships for insiders, dummy if board 
interlock exists, percentage of CEO ownership, dummy if directors are paid deferred 
compensation, and dummy if directors are paid deferred stock compensation. The 
following variables were statistically significant when bank performance was measured 
as Tobin‘s Q and as ROA: the capital ratio, the volatility of stock price (in most model 
specifications), the number of Tier 1 subsidiaries, and the number of Tier 1 foreign 
nonbanking subsidiaries (in two of four model specifications). In addition, the following 
variables were significant only when bank performance was measured as ROA: the 
number of U.S. states of Tier 1 subsidiaries, the relative size of the lead bank, the number 
of committees, the meeting fees paid to directors, the average of other directorships for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
their analysis to include the period from 1959–1985, when bank mergers and the bank holding company 
structure were less common.  
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insiders, the percentage of CEO ownership, the existence of a board interlock, and 
directors being paid in deferred stock compensation.  
In their study of 76 bank holding companies from 1992–1997 for which executive 
compensation data were available in S&P‘s ExecuComp database, Sierra et al. (2006) 
report that the relative strength of the board of directors is positively associated with bank 
size and bank financial performance measured as ROA and negatively associated with 
CEO compensation. The authors create an overall measure of board strength from a 
composite of seven individual board characteristics, each of which is given equal weight. 
The following characteristics are incorporated into the board strength variable: 
percentage of board members who are executives of the company, percentage of outside 
directors in which a company officer serves on that outside director‘s board, percentage 
of directors who either are family members of the CEO or have contracts with the 
company, percentage of directors who are outside directors and sit on at least two other 
boards, percentage of directors who are outside directors and over the age of 65, whether 
the CEO also serves as the chairman of the board, and the total number of board 
members. For the board strength variable, the authors assign a value of one if the 
composite score is in the bottom quartile, two if it is in the two middle quartiles, and 
three if it is in the top quartile. The authors indicate that the board strength variable was 
constructed such that ―a higher value represents a potentially more independent and 
effective board and therefore a theoretically stronger board‖ (p. 111). (However, the 
authors do not discuss how the individual characteristics composing board strength are 
related to bank performance.) In addition to the board strength variable, the study also 
includes variables for CEO compensation (a composite variable including salary, bonus, 
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long-term incentive plan payouts, the value of restricted stock granted during the year, 
the value of employee stock options granted during the year, and stock appreciation rights 
granted during the year), total assets, the ratio of market value of equity to the book value 
of equity, the tenure of the CEO in years, the sensitivity of the CEO‘s stock and options 
holdings to a 1% change in stock price, regulatory supervisory ratings, the proportion of 
risk-priced funding to total assets, and returns to stockholders (measured as dividends 
plus stock appreciation divided by beginning of the year share price). The only significant 
explanatory variables for bank performance were board strength, total assets, and CEO 
compensation.  
Using a sample of 69 large commercial banks from 6 developed countries 
(Canada, U.S., U.K., Spain, France, and Italy) and financial information for the years 
1995–2005, Andres and Vallelado (2008) report significant inverted U-shaped 
relationships between bank performance and board size, and between the proportion of 
nonexecutive directors and bank performance. No significant results are reported for 
number of board meetings. The results indicate diminishing returns after board size and 
the percentage of outside directors reach optimum levels.
8
 These results are consistent 
across the three measures of bank performance including Tobin‘s Q, ROA, and 
shareholders‘ annual market returns. Control variables include size, business mix, 
regulation, market power of the banking industry, bank ownership structure, and 
investors‘ legal protection.  
In the single study addressing the relationship between certain corporate 
governance policies and the financial performance of non–publicly traded banks, Cooper 
                                                          
8
In this study‘s sample, the optimum board size was approximately 19 directors, and the optimum 
percentage of outside directors was approximately 80%.  
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(2009) uses confidential data contained in regulatory examinations and financial data as 
of year-end 2005 for 296 community banks in the United States. Using a simultaneous 
regression approach, the researcher finds statistically significant and positive 
relationships between each of the following variables and bank performance (measured 
as ROA): the size of a bank, a bank‘s CAMELS rating, a bank CEO‘s tenure, and board 
size. CAMELS ratings—explained in more detail later—are designed to assess the 
overall financial health of banks and are assigned by bank regulatory bodies after 
periodic on-site bank examinations. Among the other variables included in the study are 
the percentage of insiders on the board, the total equity divided by total assets, CEO 
duality, the percentage of women directors, and the percentage of directors over the age 
of 65.  
In summary, it is fair to say that research has failed to document a consistent and 
clear association between corporate governance variables and the financial performance 
of both commercial firms and banks. The board composition research has largely been 
motivated by agency relationships, and therefore the focus has been on the boards‘ 
monitoring role of management. A striking omission from all of the prior bank-related 
studies is the industry experience and accounting expertise of the directors. This study 
addresses this shortcoming and complements previous research—which has tended to 
employ agency theory—by assessing how the resources provided by directors may affect 
bank survival. It does so by employing theories on experience-based human capital and 
resource dependence. 
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Importance of Human Capital and Resource Dependence Theories 
In their widely cited work on boards of directors and corporate financial 
performance, Zahra and Pearce (1989) propose a model that includes three important 
board roles: service, strategy, and control. Service involves enhancing the company‘s 
reputation, helping the company establish contacts with its external environment, and 
providing counsel to the company‘s senior executives (Carpenter, 1988; Louden, 1982; as 
cited in Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Their model suggests that the strategic role includes 
directors providing advice and counsel to the company‘s senior executives, initiating their 
own analyses of strategic options and suggesting strategic alternatives. The control 
function requires directors to evaluate the performance of the company and senior 
executives, and protect shareholders‘ interests (Chapin, 1986; Louden, 1982; as cited in 
Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Despite the multidimensional nature of directors‘ roles in the 
corporate governance function, researchers have most often focused on the board‘s 
responsibility to monitor or control senior management as a means of protecting 
stockholders‘ interests (Dalton et al., 1998; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989). It is not surprising, therefore, that researchers have relied heavily on agency theory 
to guide their research (Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Finegold et al., 2007; Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), although there is only a moderate level of 
empirical support for agency theory in this context (Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  
An alternative theoretical perspective—resource dependence theory—has been 
employed to a significantly lesser extent than agency theory when exploring the 
relationship between boards and firm performance (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), yet there is 
strong but somewhat limited empirical support for the tenets of resource dependence in 
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this context (Zahra & Pearce, 1989). From a resource dependence standpoint, directors 
possess skills, talents, and abilities acquired through education and experience that 
enhance the resources available to the boards they serve on (Hillman, Cannella, & Harris, 
2002).  
Despite the fact that directors are widely acknowledged as providing senior 
management with advice and counsel, the topic of directors‘ knowledge and skills in 
fulfilling their governing responsibilities has received little attention from corporate 
governance scholars (Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009). Instead, it appears that until recently 
there has been an implicit assumption that directors possess the depth of knowledge and 
skills required by their fiduciary roles. Within the last few years, however, researchers 
have begun to question that assumption (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Carter & Lorsch, 
2004).  
A component of resource dependence is that of human capital. Becker (1993) 
defines human capital as an individual‘s set of competencies, knowledge, and skills. Such 
capital is typically developed through investments in education, training, and professional 
work experience. There is a substantial body of research focusing on the human capital of 
top management teams and professional employees (Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 
2001; Kor & Leblebici, 2005). With respect to boards of directors, some scholars have 
proposed that directors‘ human capital impacts their ability to provide advice and counsel 
to management and to fulfill their monitoring and oversight responsibilities (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003). Cravens and Wallace (2001, p. 9) posit that directors, especially outside 
directors, ―bring their individual expertise to the board based upon their own knowledge 
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and experience. This expertise often stems from a director‘s employment history with 
various firms during his or her career.‖ 
The theoretical arguments for applying resource dependence and human capital 
theories to boards of directors are supported by anecdotal evidence. For instance, 
although Citigroup had 18 directors (including 16 who were independent), in early 2008, 
only one of those directors had ever worked at a financial services firm, and that 
individual was simultaneously the CEO of a large entertainment company (Pozen, 2010). 
Also, in its 2011 Public Company Governance Survey, the National Association of 
Corporate Directors (NACD) reports that public company directors cited ―specific 
industry experience‖ and ―financial expertise‖ as two of the top three attributes and 
experiences that are most important when they recruit new directors to their boards 
(NACD, 2011). The third attribute was ―leadership experience,‖ which was not defined in 
the open-ended survey question. As the data sources used in this study do not include 
information on directors‘ leadership experience, this attribute will not be included in this 
study.  
Moreover, in response to calls by investors for additional information that would 
enhance their ability to make informed voting and investing decisions, in 2009 the SEC 
released a final rule regarding proxy disclosure enhancements that became effective 
February 28, 2010 (SEC, 2009). Those enhancements: 
require companies to disclose for each director and any nominee for 
director the particular experience, qualifications, and attributes or skills 
that led the board to conclude that the person should serve as a director for 
23 
 
 
the company as of the time that a filing containing this disclosure is made 
with the Commission. (SEC, 2009, p. 34) 
The new rule also requires disclosure if ―particular skills, such as risk assessment or 
financial reporting expertise, were part of the specific experience, qualifications, 
attributes or skills that led the board or proponent to conclude that the person should 
serve as a director‖ (SEC, 2009, p. 35). The final rule requires that these disclosures be 
made annually. Thus, it is clear that regulators and directors are placing increasing 
importance on both the industry experience and the financial expertise of directors. 
Banking Industry Expertise  
It is widely acknowledged that human capital is developed over time and that 
individual directors bring unique resources to their organizations as a result of their 
professional backgrounds, their technical skills and expertise, their industry work 
experience, and their life experiences (Kesner, 1988). Occupational differences, one 
aspect of human capital, ―reflect the heterogeneity of resources such as expertise, skill, 
information, and potential linkages to other external constituencies‖ (Hillman et al., 2002, 
p. 749).  
In an effort to develop a more complete understanding of boards, Hillman, 
Cannella, and Paetzold (2000) develop a taxonomy with four distinct categories of 
directors: insiders, business experts, support specialists, and community influentials. 
According to this framework, support specialists are directors who provide specialized 
expertise on law, banking, insurance, or public relations and are typically employed 
(currently or formerly) as lawyers, bankers, marketing professionals, and public relations 
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experts.
9
 Support specialists are somewhat analogous to directors with bank work 
experience and bank director experience—the types of directors that are the focus of this 
study.  
Resource dependence theory asserts that directors bring to their boards a bundle 
of resources: expertise, different perspectives, relationships with other firms, and 
legitimacy (Hillman et al., 2002). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) state that directors benefit 
their firms by providing vital resources—either directly or by assisting them through their 
connections with external parties—and by helping management to set and monitor the 
firm‘s business strategies. ―Resource dependence theory embraces the view that board 
members enhance the value of the firm through developing and monitoring a firm‘s 
strategic responses to deal with the dynamic and competitive environment‖ (Sharma, 
Boo, & Sharma, 2008, p. 107). 
A number of studies published in recent years employ the resource dependence 
perspective and contend that directors‘ ability to fulfill their fiduciary responsibilities is 
predicated on their relevant industry knowledge, their professional business experience, 
and their basic understanding of the firm‘s competitive position. Thus, a board composed 
of directors with industry-specific experience is likely to perform its duties more 
effectively (Cohen, Wright, & Krishnamoorthy, 2007; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Sharma, 
2006). In fact, Robert Pozen, who has been the president or chairman of two global 
financial firms, an independent director of several large industrial companies, and a well-
                                                          
9
Insiders are defined as those directors who currently serve or have served as active managers, employees, 
or owners of the firm. They provide the board with information about the firm itself and its competitive 
environment. Business experts are defined as active or retired executives in other for-profit organizations 
and directors who serve on other corporate boards. They serve as sounding boards for ideas and provide 
alternative viewpoints on internal and external problems. Community influentials are defined as directors 
who bring to the board nonbusiness perspectives on issues, problems, and ideas. They often have expertise 
about and influence with powerful community groups.  
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known corporate governance scholar, recently proposed the concept of a professional 
board (Pozen, 2010). One aspect of his proposal is that most directors would be required 
to have extensive expertise in their companies‘ lines of business.  
In the absence of prior studies on industry-specific experience in the banking 
industry, I draw on literature on human capital, auditor industry specialization, and audit 
committee industry specialists to support my first hypothesis related to the presence of 
directors with bank work experience on a bank‘s board of directors. 
Several studies support the view that human intellectual capital positively impacts 
firm value (Black & Lynch, 1996; Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001; Hitt et al., 
2001). However, these studies have tended to focus on the intellectual capital of 
employees (Kalyta, 2011). Only recently have researchers begun to consider the 
intellectual capital of a company‘s directors and its potential to positively impact 
company performance and value. For instance, McDonald, Westphal, and Graebner 
(2008) propose and find support for the idea that outside directors‘ previous experience 
with acquisitions has a positive impact on the success of their companies‘ corporate 
acquisitions.  
Kalyta (2011) takes a broader perspective and proposes that a board‘s intellectual 
capital will positively influence firm value in knowledge-intensive industries, such as 
information technology, chemical products, and pharmaceuticals. Specifically, he uses 
the number of scientists on the board as a proxy for the board‘s intellectual capital and 
posits that ―boards with strong scientific expertise are more likely to make and approve 
effective strategic decisions concerning R&D related acquisitions, major product 
innovations or new scientific initiatives than boards with limited scientific experience‖ 
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(Kalyta, 2011, p. 3). Using the population of publicly listed U.S. companies for 2008, 
Kalyta first identifies companies with one or more directors with a doctoral degree (the 
author uses the terms ―director-scientist‖ and ―director with a Ph.D.‖ interchangeably) 
and then identifies companies that appointed at least one such director between 2004 and 
2008. Using Tobin‘s Q as the measure of firm value, Kalyta reports that the appointment 
of a scientist director in a knowledge-intensive industry is associated with a sizable 
increase in firm value, but he finds no such significant association in other industries. 
Kalyta also finds that the appointment of scientist directors in knowledge-intensive 
industries increases the stock price in a three-day window around the announcement by 
1%, while the 12-month postevent period is characterized by a positive abnormal return 
of up to 2.5%. The same effect is not observed in other industries. Overall, these results 
suggest that ―scientists on the board of directors constitute a significant asset and a driver 
of superior performance in knowledge-intensive sectors‖ (p. 5) and that ―directors‘ 
knowledge has a significant impact on firm value, over and above other measures of 
‗good‘ governance used in previous research‖ (p. 5).  
While not related to firm performance, the literature on auditor-industry 
specialization and audit committee industry experience further illustrates the value of 
industry-specific knowledge to the firm. The central premise of the auditor-industry 
specialization literature is that specialized industry knowledge is critical for auditors to 
discharge their professional responsibilities with high quality. For instance, Krishnan 
(2003, p. 2) states that ―auditors who have a more comprehensive understanding of an 
industry‘s characteristics and trends will be more effective in auditing than auditors 
without such industry knowledge.‖ The established auditor-industry specialization 
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literature has consistently demonstrated that specialist auditors provide higher quality 
services than auditors who are not industry specialists (Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang, 2003; 
Bedard & Biggs, 1991; Johnson, Jamal, & Berryman, 1991; Krishnan, 2003; Owhoso, 
Messier, & Lynch, 2002; Romanus, Maher, & Fleming, 2008), and that these specialist 
auditors are more compliant with professional auditing standards (O‘Keefe, King, & 
Gaver, 1994). Collectively, this literature concludes that the quality of the audit and the 
resulting financial statements is higher when the auditor is an industry specialist than 
when the auditor is not an industry specialist.  
Market reaction studies (e.g., Knechel, Naiker, & Pacheco, 2007) provide further 
evidence of the value of industry specialist auditors. Specifically, Knechel et al. report 
that the market reacts positively to firms switching from a nonspecialist auditor to an 
industry specialist auditor, while the market‘s reaction is negative when the successor 
auditor is not an industry specialist. 
In a study focusing on industry expertise on the audit committee of the board of 
directors, Cohen, Hoitash, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright (2014) find a significantly lower 
likelihood of a firm incurring an accounting restatement when industry experience is 
represented on the audit committee. They posit that directors with experience in their 
firms‘ industries will have a better understanding of the business and accounting issues, 
and therefore be more capable of identifying complex issues that may not be apparent to 
directors without such experience. However, Cohen et al. do not examine how industry-
relevant experience of the directors is related to either firm performance or firm failure, a 
gap which the current study is designed to address. Furthermore, Cohen et al. exclude 
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regulated industries (including commercial banks) from their sample. I am not aware of 
any published studies that examine the effects of directors‘ industry experience in banks.  
In light of the evidence suggesting that industry specialist auditors provide higher 
quality service than non–industry specialist auditors, and the finding that industry 
experience of directors serving on the audit committee of the board of directors brings 
more effective governance to the firm, it is a reasonable conjecture that directors with 
commercial banking experience will bring similar industry-relevant expertise to their 
boardroom responsibilities. Similarly, it is reasonable to conclude that directors with 
experience on the boards of other banks (either previous or contemporaneous experience) 
will also bring industry-specific expertise to their roles that will enhance their banks‘ 
survival prospects in the event of a difficult economic environment. Therefore, given the 
theoretical support from the resource dependence and human capital theories, and 
empirical results from the prior nonbanking literature suggesting a link between human 
intellectual capital and firm value, the first research hypotheses are framed as follows:  
H1: Banks with directors on the board possessing bank work experience will be 
associated with a lower likelihood of failure. 
H2: Banks with directors on the board possessing bank director experience will be 
associated with a lower likelihood of failure.  
Accounting and Financial Expertise 
In response to numerous well-publicized accounting scandals early in the last 
decade, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Section 407 of 
SOX required the SEC to adopt rules mandating that the audit committee of the board of 
directors of public firms include at least one member who is considered a ―financial 
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expert‖ or disclose reasons for not adopting this requirement (Dhaliwal et al., 2010). 
Although SOX outlined a rather restrictive definition of financial expertise, including 
only individuals with accounting or auditing experience, the SEC ultimately adopted a 
broader definition of financial expertise that includes not only accounting but also certain 
types of nonaccounting (finance and supervisory) financial expertise. Essentially, the 
SEC‘s definition of a financial expert includes accountants as well as those with 
experience as an investment banker, as a financial analyst, or in any other financial 
management role, and individuals with supervisory experience overseeing the preparation 
of financial statements—including CEOs and company presidents (Dhaliwal et al., 2010).  
 Several studies using pre-SOX data find that the presence of a financial expert on 
the audit committee is positively related to the quality of financial reporting (Abbott et 
al., 2004; Bédard, Chtourou, & Courteau, 2004). Similarly, Krishnan (2005) finds that 
audit committees with financial expertise are significantly less likely to be associated 
with the incidence of internal control problems, such as reportable conditions and 
material weaknesses. The results of this literature are commensurate with the market‘s 
perception of appointing directors with financial expertise. Public companies were not 
required prior to the enactment of SOX to have at least one member of the audit 
committee who met the definition of a financial expert (or disclose reasons for not having 
one), but some companies chose to do so. DeFond et al. (2005) examine three-day 
cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of 702 newly appointed outside 
directors assigned to audit committees. They observe a positive market reaction to the 
appointment of accounting financial experts to audit committees but no such reaction to 
the appointment of nonaccounting financial experts. This finding suggests that not all 
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types of financial experts are perceived by the market as providing value; accounting 
experts are presumed to provide more relevant expertise.  
It is not surprising that post-SOX studies show that accounting experts are 
associated with a higher quality system of internal controls over financial reporting and 
higher quality financial statements (Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Hoitash, Hoitash, & Bedard, 
2009; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008; Naiker & Sharma, 2009; Zhang, Zhou, & Zhou, 
2007). The general idea emerging from these studies is that accounting experts have a 
better understanding of the complexities associated with financial reporting in a post-
SOX environment and, leveraging their expertise, they are better able to identify and take 
corrective actions if the financial information contains irregularities or mistakes. 
It is important for management and other stakeholders to make economic 
decisions based on information that is fairly and correctly prepared. Failure to do so can 
lead to poor-quality decisions and adverse economic consequences. The Financial 
Accounting Standards Board‘s (FASB) conceptual framework indicates that the objective 
of general purpose financial reporting is to provide financial information about an entity 
that is useful to existing and potential investors, lenders, and other creditors in making 
decisions about providing resources to that entity (FASB, 2010). If financial information 
is to be useful to decision makers, it must be relevant (capable of making a difference) 
and faithfully represent what it purports to represent. Research supporting the concept of 
financial information that is useful in a decision-making context in the banking industry 
shows that bankers tend to make incorrect company failure prediction judgments when 
they use financial information that is tainted, but make better-quality company failure 
prediction judgments when the information is relatively free from the risk of 
31 
 
 
misrepresentation (Sharma & Iselin, 2003a, b). Extending this notion to boards of 
directors and firm performance suggests that boards will be able to make more-informed 
economic decisions about the firm if the financial information presented to them is of 
high quality.  
The prior research reviewed above shows that directors with accounting expertise 
are associated with higher quality financial information. Furthermore, when companies 
seek advice and consulting services on turnaround strategies, they often turn to 
accounting firms such as the Big 4 (KPMG, E&Y, PwC, Deloitte). In fact, a review of the 
Big 4 firms‘ websites indicates that each firm has a sizable worldwide consulting 
segment, and Deloitte‘s site refers to itself as the ―world‘s largest management consulting 
firm.‖ Moreover, each site includes links to publications and individuals to contact 
regarding ―turnaround‖ services. Clearly, the accounting and finance knowledge of the 
experts at these firms is respected in the marketplace because it enables them to quickly 
assess the causes of impending failure and to recommend corrective actions. Thus, boards 
including accounting experts could be expected to have better-quality financial 
information and make better-quality decisions about future performance, including 
strategies for enhancing performance and avoiding calamities such as bankruptcy. 
Therefore, based on the foregoing discussion, there is considerable empirical 
support for the importance of having accounting expertise represented on boards of 
directors, and the third hypothesis follows:  
H3: Banks with directors on the board possessing accounting expertise will be 
associated with a lower likelihood of failure.  
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Employing the same logic that supports the first three hypotheses, the fourth 
research hypothesis is as follows:  
H4: Banks with directors on the board possessing bank work experience, bank 
director experience, and accounting expertise will be associated with a relatively 
lower likelihood of failure than banks with directors on the board possessing bank 
work experience, bank director experience, or accounting expertise.  
Director Tenure  
The topic of director tenure and its potential to impact firm performance is an 
empirical issue that has garnered substantially less attention from scholars than has 
industry experience or accounting expertise. A partial explanation for the lack of focus on 
director tenure may be that there is no clear hypothesis for the relationship between 
director tenure and firm performance. Indeed, there are two competing views on this 
subject.  
The first view is that a director‘s ability to provide advice and counsel to senior 
management and to monitor management on behalf of the stockholders is enhanced over 
time. This expertise hypothesis ―suggests that a long-term director engagement is 
associated with greater experience, commitment, and competence, because it provides a 
director with important knowledge about the firm and its business environment‖ (Vafeas, 
2003, p. 1044). The logic of this perspective is that directors acquire firm-specific 
knowledge (e.g., the strengths and weaknesses of senior management) and industry-
specific knowledge (with respect to the firm‘s competitive environment and business 
strategy) over time that enhances their ability to meet their fiduciary responsibilities to 
the stockholders.  
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An argument can be made that the extended periods of economic expansion 
experienced by the United States in recent decades has lengthened the ideal tenure of 
directors—especially in the banking industry. Over the last three decades, the United 
States has enjoyed prolonged periods of economic growth punctuated with relatively 
brief periods of economic contraction in the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and the early 
2000s until the Great Recession took hold in 2008 and led to the latest wave of significant 
bank failures. Thus, during the last 30 years, it would have been possible for a director to 
serve on a bank‘s board for an extended period of time without ever having to confront a 
prolonged and pronounced economic downturn and the corresponding effects of 
nonperforming loans, customer bankruptcies, etc.  
 Empirical results supporting the expertise-based tenure hypothesis are provided 
by Bédard et al. (2004). In this study, the researchers examine the relationships among 
the audit committee‘s expertise, independence, and activities and aggressive earnings 
management using a sample of 300 U.S. companies. They find a negative relationship 
between the average tenure of outside directors on the audit committee and the likelihood 
of the firm reporting abnormal accruals (a measure of financial reporting quality). The 
authors conclude that:  
knowledge of the company‘s operations and of its executive directors 
acquired through experience as a member of the board seems to be 
effective in constraining aggressive earnings management and 
complacency does not seem to offset the value of firm-specific knowledge 
as tenure increases. (Bédard et al., 2004, p. 29) 
34 
 
 
Similarly, Beasley (1996) reports that as the tenure of outside directors increases, the 
likelihood of financial statement fraud decreases. Hence, these studies suggest that boards 
composed of directors with longer tenure can be beneficial. 
The second view is characterized by the management-friendliness hypothesis 
(Vafeas, 2003). Under this framework, directors with longer tenures are more likely to 
befriend executive management over time and less likely to aggressively monitor 
management on behalf of the stockholders. The logic is that as social and business ties 
develop between senior executives and outside directors, the directors become less 
motivated to challenge management and are more of a rubber stamp for company 
management. Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that supports this perspective. For 
instance, in 2001 Enron‘s board of directors was composed of several directors with 20 or 
more years of service on the company‘s board or its predecessor companies‘ boards (U.S. 
Senate, 2002). Therefore, it is not surprising that corporate governance advocates such as 
the National Association of Corporate Directors and the Council of Institutional Investors 
have proposed limits on director tenure (Sharma & Iselin, 2012).  
However, there is limited empirical evidence supporting the management-
friendliness hypothesis. Sharma and Iselin (2012) report a significant and positive 
relationship between the tenure of outside directors on the audit committee and financial 
misstatements in a post-SOX period. They conclude that longer tenure of outside 
directors results in ―an enduring association with management‖ that compromises ―the 
effectiveness of their oversight responsibilities‖ (Sharma & Iselin, 2012, p. 30). Vafeas 
(2003) also finds evidence that extreme board tenure may be detrimental to the interests 
of stockholders. Specifically, he notes that longer-tenured directors serving on the 
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compensation committee are more likely to be associated with significantly higher CEO 
compensation and that the presence of directors with 20 or more years of service on the 
board is more likely to be associated with CEO entrenchment. These two studies suggest 
that boards composed of directors with longer tenure can have adverse economic 
consequences for a company. 
In summary, whether there is a systematic relationship between board tenure and 
firm performance remains an open question. While there is limited empirical evidence 
both in support of and against longer tenure, I am not aware of any empirical studies on 
the association between board tenure and firm performance other than the Mishra and 
Nielsen (2000) study discussed earlier, which addresses the tenure of independent board 
members in relation to the tenure of the CEO. Accordingly, the next research hypothesis 
is stated in the null form:  
H5: There is no association between the tenure of directors on a bank‘s board and 
the likelihood of bank failure.  
Theories about the impact of director tenure can be extended to directors on the 
board with banking experience and accounting expertise. Directors with banking 
experience but serving for longer periods on a bank‘s board can either have accumulated 
greater knowledge and insight, and thus be more effective in their monitoring and 
advising roles, or succumb to managerial influences because of the developed friendship 
ties. The same logic applies to directors with accounting expertise. Therefore, the 
following two hypotheses are advanced: 
H6: There is no association between the tenure of directors with bank work 
experience on a bank‘s board and the likelihood of bank failure. 
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H7: There is no association between the tenure of directors with accounting 
expertise on a bank‘s board and the likelihood of bank failure.  
The Audit Committee  
Risk appetite is defined as ―the amount of risk, on a broad level, an organization 
is willing to accept in pursuit of value‖ (Rittenberg & Martens, 2012, p. 1). The board of 
directors is ultimately responsible for approving the risk appetite recommended by senior 
executives and for monitoring and assessing a company‘s overall risk profile as 
conditions change (Rittenberg & Martens, 2012). Yet, in a December 2010 report on 
board risk oversight, a survey of more than 200 board members indicated that 50% of the 
directors from financial services companies reported that their boards are not executing 
mature and robust risk oversight processes (COSO, 2010). In fact, in evaluating the 
overall effectiveness of their boards‘ risk oversight programs, only 12% of board 
members rated their processes as highly effective, while 47% responded that their 
processes either were ineffective or needed some improvement. Perhaps even more 
telling is the fact that only 13% of the responding directors indicated their boards‘ 
monitoring of the risk management process was performed as a ―robust and mature 
activity, with the board satisfied with the supporting process‖ (COSO, 2010, p. 10). 
Substantial percentages of the directors responded that the supporting process for 
monitoring changes in the environment that could impact both corporate strategy and 
associated risks either was done on an ad hoc basis or was not performed at all. Perhaps 
in an effort to prod companies into developing and funding risk monitoring activities and 
as a means of enhancing investors‘ ability to evaluate whether the board‘s oversight of a 
company‘s risk management activities is appropriate, the final rule issued by the SEC in 
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2009 and discussed earlier also requires enhanced proxy disclosures regarding the 
board‘s role in the risk oversight process (SEC, 2009). One consequence of the financial 
crisis that is the motivation for this study is an increased focus on the effectiveness of 
boards‘ oversight responsibilities with respect to corporate risk management (COSO, 
2009).  
In reality, however, the full board often delegates its risk oversight role to the 
audit committee (Deloitte, 2011). In fact, two relatively recent reports have indicated that 
the audit committee is the primary committee responsible for monitoring corporate risks 
(64% per Deloitte, 2011) or that the audit committee has extensive involvement in risk 
oversight across the entire organization (59% per COSO, 2010). Hence, in addition to 
their responsibilities associated with the financial reporting function, a company‘s system 
of internal controls, and dealing with the internal audit function as well as the external 
auditors, audit committee members at most public companies are also accountable for 
evaluating and monitoring their companies‘ risk profiles on an ongoing basis.  
In light of criticisms of excessive risk-taking by banks from academic researchers 
(Peni & Vähämaa, 2012) as well as the Chairman of the Federal Reserve (Bernanke, 
2010), it appears that an examination of the audit committees of commercial banks during 
the latest banking crisis is both warranted and necessary. In their analysis, Cole and 
White (2012) cite excessive risk in banks‘ loan portfolios as a major cause of the recent 
bank failures, suggesting that neither bank boards nor their audit committees 
appropriately carried out their risk management responsibilities.  
Given that most boards delegate risk management oversight to the audit 
committee and given that the causes of the bank failures during the 2008–2011 timeframe 
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are not unique and relate directly to the audit committee‘s responsibility for financial 
reporting (e.g., determining the adequacy of the bank‘s provision for loan losses), the fact 
that so many banks failed to account for the extreme levels of risk in their loan portfolios 
suggests that audit committee members were lax in their duties, were not appropriately 
qualified for their audit committee roles, or both. Following the logic of the experience-
based human capital theory, it is reasonable to assume that audit committee members 
with banking experience or accounting expertise would be more qualified in meeting 
their fiduciary risk oversight responsibilities. This reasoning leads to the following four 
research hypotheses:  
H8: Banks with directors on the audit committee possessing bank work 
experience will be associated with a lower likelihood of failure.  
H9: Banks with directors on the audit committee possessing bank director 
experience will be associated with a lower likelihood of failure.  
H10: Banks with directors on the audit committee possessing accounting expertise 
will be associated with a lower likelihood of failure.  
H11: Banks with directors on the audit committee possessing bank work 
experience, bank director experience, and accounting expertise will be associated 
with a relatively lower likelihood of failure than banks with directors on the audit 
committee possessing only bank work experience, bank director experience, or 
accounting expertise.  
With respect to directors‘ tenure on the audit committee, the conflicting theories 
discussed earlier in relation to board members are relevant with respect to audit 
committee members. One can argue that industry- and bank-specific knowledge gained 
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over years of service would translate into more-effective oversight at the audit committee 
level. However, one could similarly argue that longer tenure causes directors to shirk 
their duties as suggested by the management-friendliness perspective. Therefore, the final 
three research hypotheses are stated in the null form:  
H12: There is no association between the tenure of directors on a bank‘s audit 
committee and the likelihood of bank failure.  
H13: There is no association between the tenure of directors with bank work 
experience on a bank‘s audit committee and the likelihood of bank failure.  
H14: There is no association between the tenure of directors with accounting 
expertise on a bank‘s audit committee and the likelihood of bank failure.  
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CHAPTER 3  
METHODOLOGY  
Determination of the Research Sample 
The sample for this study includes all U.S. commercial banks that failed during 
the period 2008–2011. The latest series of bank failures began in 2008. In fact, there were 
no commercial bank failures in 2005 or 2006 and only three failures in 2007. However, 
there were 19 commercial bank failures in 2008. The sample period ends in 2011 in order 
to ensure that nonfailed matching banks did not subsequently fail shortly after the end of 
the sample period.  
The sample selection starts from all nationally chartered banks that are members 
of the Federal Reserve and supervised by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
(OCC, 2013), all state-chartered Fed members supervised by the Federal Reserve, and all 
state-chartered non-Fed member institutions supervised by the FDIC. A bank is 
considered ―failed‖ if it is listed in the Failed Bank List maintained by the FDIC. Recall 
that per the FDIC‘s website, a bank failure is deemed to have occurred when a bank is 
closed by a federal or state banking regulatory agency and that a bank is generally closed 
when it is unable to meet its obligations to depositors and others (http://www.fdic.gov/ 
consumers/ banking/facts/). From the beginning of 2008 through the end of 2011, the 
Failed Bank List reflects a total of 413 failures. Included in the total are 59 thrift and 
savings banks (50 FDIC-supervised state-chartered thrifts and OCC-supervised federally 
chartered thrifts and 9 state-chartered FDIC-supervised savings banks) that were 
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excluded to derive the commercial bank sample. (Thrift and savings banks operate under 
charters that are different from those of commercial banks; the financial information of 
thrift and savings banks is presently different from that of commercial banks; and thrift 
and savings banks are operationally different from commercial banks in that they focus 
exclusively on making home loans and offering savings accounts to customers. For these 
reasons, thrifts and savings banks were excluded from the sample.) Of the remaining 354 
failed commercial banks, 65 were public institutions and 289 were privately owned 
institutions. The public banks are the focus of this study because the director-related 
information for the private banks generally is not publicly available. In virtually all the 
cases of bank failures during the sample period, the banks were part of a one-bank 
holding company (BHC), and it was the BHC that was the public entity. Public banks and 
bank holding companies are required to file Form DEF 14A (Definitive Proxy Statement) 
documents with the SEC. Those proxy statements typically indicate the individuals who 
are the directors of the BHC and the individuals who are directors of the operating banks. 
Most of the biographical information on the directors was obtained from these annual 
proxy statements.  
In a total of 15 instances over the three-year study period, the 65 banks referred to 
here as public institutions actually include banks that were not publicly owned but met 
the reporting requirements of the SEC. Companies with at least $10 million in total assets 
and whose securities are held by at least 500 owners generally must file disclosure reports 
with the SEC. Although the public banks accounted for only about 22% of the total 
commercial bank failures during the four-year period under review, the assets of those 
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banks represented approximately 51% of the total assets of all failed banks, and $17 
billion in lost market capitalization.  
Consistent with previous bank failure literature (Espahbodi, 1991; Lane et al., 
1986; Meyer & Pifer, 1970), I employ a matched-pairs design because it helps control for 
extraneous effects and is a more efficient design when the data have to be hand-collected. 
I identify one matched nonfailed bank for each failed bank in the sample. For reasons 
outlined below, matching was accomplished based on bank age, size (total assets), and 
geographic markets. Additionally, the nonfailed bank in each matched-pair must not have 
failed by September 30, 2012, as confirmed by the Failed Bank List on that date.  
As is the case with most new business start-ups, new banks are often financially 
fragile, and their asset portfolios are less diversified than those of more established banks, 
leading to a greater variability in earnings. If a bank is able to reach financial maturity, its 
risk of failure declines sharply (Cole & Curry, 2011; DeYoung, 2003). Thus, matched 
nonfailed banks were selected first on the basis of bank age. Matching on the basis of 
asset size was accomplished with as close a match between the failed and nonfailed banks 
as possible; in all possible situations, banks were deemed to be of similar size if their 
total assets were within ±30% in the year of failure. My review of previous bank failure 
studies indicates that specific criteria for determining a size match between failed and 
nonfailed banks are not always disclosed. In one instance, the total assets of a bank were 
―not allowed to exceed twice those of its matching bank‖ (Lane et al., 1986). Finally, 
matching on the basis of geographic markets allows for and helps to control for 
differences in economic conditions in the prevailing markets.
10
 
                                                          
10
 Four states—California, Florida, Georgia, and Illinois—accounted for 40 of the 65 banks that failed 
between 2008 and 2011 that were registrants with the SEC at the time of their failure.  
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Therefore, the sample for this study was 65 failed banks that were registrants with 
the SEC at the time of their failure from 2008–2011 and 65 nonfailed matching banks. 
Data were collected on 130 banks for one year before failure (Year 1). Due to missing 
data on failed banks, the matched-pairs sample dropped to 128 total banks two years 
before failure (Year 2) and to 116 total banks three years before failure (Year 3).  
Variables  
 See Table 1 for a list of the test and control variables, their expected associations 
with bank failure, their definitions, and the sources of the related data. The information 
for all the variables was collected for the three-year period leading up to failure of the 
failed banks; the same information was collected for the matched nonfailed banks for the 
corresponding periods.  
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Table 1 
 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Name 
Expected 
Sign 
Variable Description Data Source 
Dependent Variable     
BANK_FAILURE   Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank has failed per 
FDIC‘s List of Failed Banks; 0 otherwise  
FDIC List of Failed Banks 
Test Variables     
BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE  – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at 
least one member who has commercial bank work 
experience; 0 otherwise  
Form DEF 14A 
BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at 
least one nonexecutive director who has commercial 
bank work experience; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE  – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at 
least one independent director who has commercial 
bank work experience; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at 
least one member who has commercial bank director 
experience; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at 
least one nonexecutive director who has commercial 
bank director experience; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE  – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at 
least one independent director who has commercial 
bank director experience; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
BOD_SPECACCTG_ONE  – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at 
least one member who has specific accounting 
experience as a CPA or in public accounting; 0 
otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
   (continued) 
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Table 1 (continued)   
 
 
 
Variable Name 
Expected 
Sign 
Variable Description Data Source 
BOD_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE  – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at 
least one nonexecutive director who has specific 
accounting experience as a CPA or in public 
accounting; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
BOD_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE  – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at 
least one independent director who has specific 
accounting experience as a CPA or in public 
accounting; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
BOD_POTACCTG_ONE  – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at 
least one member who has work experience as a 
chief financial officer, vice president of finance, or 
controller; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
BOD_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE  – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at 
least one nonexecutive director who has work 
experience as a chief financial officer, vice president 
of finance, or controller; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
BOD_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE  – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at 
least one independent director who has work 
experience as a chief financial officer, vice president 
of finance, or controller; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS +/- Sum of total board service for all members of the 
board divided by the size of the board 
Form DEF 14A 
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS  +/- Sum of total board service for all nonexecutive 
directors divided by the total number of 
nonexecutive directors on the board  
Form DEF 14A 
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS  +/- Sum of total board service for all independent 
directors divided by the total number of independent 
directors on the board  
Form DEF 14A 
   (continued) 
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Table 1 (continued)   
 
 
 
Variable Name 
Expected 
Sign 
Variable Description Data Source 
AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE  – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit 
committee has at least one member who has 
commercial bank work experience; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
AC_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit 
committee has at least one nonexecutive director 
who has commercial bank work experience; 0 
otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
AC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE  – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit 
committee has at least one member who has 
commercial bank director experience; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
AC_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit 
committee has at least one nonexecutive director 
who has commercial bank director experience; 0 
otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
AC_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE  – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit 
committee has at least one independent director who 
has commercial bank director experience; 0 
otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
AC_SPECACCTG_ONE  – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit 
committee has at least one member who has specific 
accounting experience as a CPA or in public 
accounting; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE  – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit 
committee has at least one nonexecutive director 
who has specific accounting experience as a CPA or 
in public accounting; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
AC_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE  – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit 
committee has at least one independent director who 
has specific accounting experience as a CPA or in 
public accounting; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
   (continued) 
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Table 1 (continued)   
 
 
 
Variable Name 
Expected 
Sign 
Variable Description Data Source 
AC_POTACCTG_ONE  – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit 
committee has at least one member who has work 
experience as a chief financial officer, vice president 
of finance, or controller; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
AC_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE  – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank‘s audit 
committee has at least one nonexecutive director 
who has work experience as a chief financial officer, 
vice president of finance, or controller; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
AC_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE  – Indicator variable equal to 1 if bank board has at 
least one member who has commercial bank work 
experience; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACDIRECTORS_YRS +/- Sum of total board service for all members of the 
audit committee divided by the size of the audit 
committee  
Form DEF 14A 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS  +/- Sum of total board service for all independent 
directors on the audit committee divided by the total 
number of independent directors on the audit 
committee  
Form DEF 14A 
Control Variables     
BODSIZE  +/- The natural log of the size of the board of directors  Form DEF 14A 
BODIND  +/- Proportion of the board members who are 
independent  
Form DEF 14A 
DUALITY  +/- Indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO of the bank 
is also the board chairman; 0 otherwise  
Form DEF 14A 
BODMEET  – The natural log of the number of board meetings 
annually  
Form DEF 14A 
ACSIZE  +/- The natural log of the size of the audit committee  Form DEF 14A 
EQUITY – Ratio of total equity to total assets  Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council website: 
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/ 
   (continued) 
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Table 1 (continued)   
 
 
 
Variable Name 
Expected 
Sign 
Variable Description Data Source 
ADJNPA  + Ratio of loans past due 90+ days + nonaccruing 
loans + OREO to total assets 
Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council website: 
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/ 
C&I  + Ratio of commercial and industrial loans to total 
assets  
Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council website: 
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/ 
ROA – Ratio of net income to total assets Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council website: 
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/ 
LOANS + Ratio of total loans (net) to total assets Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council website: 
https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/ 
NONAC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE – Indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank‘s non–audit 
committee members have at least one director with 
commercial bank work experience; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
NONAC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE – Indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank‘s non–audit 
committee members have at least one director with 
commercial bank director experience; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
NONAC_SPECACCTG_ONE – Indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank‘s non–audit 
committee members have at least one director with 
specific accounting experience as a CPA or in public 
accounting; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
NONAC_POTACCTG_ONE – Indicator variable equal to 1 if the bank‘s non–audit 
committee members have at least one director with 
work experience as a chief financial officer, vice 
president of finance, or controller; 0 otherwise 
Form DEF 14A 
NONAC_AVGBODTEN_NONAC_DIR +/- The sum of board service for the non–audit 
committee members of the board divided by the 
number of non–audit committee members of the 
board 
Form DEF 14A 
   (continued) 
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Table 1 (continued)   
 
 
 
Variable Name 
Expected 
Sign 
Variable Description Data Source 
NONAC_AVGBODTEN_NONAC_NONEXDIR +/- The sum of board service for the non–audit 
committee nonexecutive directors of the board 
divided by the number of non–audit committee 
nonexecutive directors of the board 
Form DEF 14A 
NONAC_AVGBODTEN_NONAC_INDEPDIR +/- The sum of board service for the non–audit 
committee independent directors of the board 
divided by the number of non–audit committee 
independent directors of the board 
Form DEF 14A 
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The dependent variable (bank failure) is dichotomous in nature and is based on 
whether or not a bank is listed in the Failed Bank List maintained by the FDIC. Bank 
failure is empirically measured as 1 for a bank in this list, and 0 otherwise. There are four 
independent variables of interest in this study—commercial bank work experience, bank 
director experience, accounting expertise, and director tenure—as each relates to both 
the board of directors and the audit committee. Because the dependent variable is 
dichotomous, I estimate a logistic regression for each of the three years prior to a bank‘s 
failure, and the empirical model takes the following form, where Pr is the probability of 
bank failure and the variables are defined below:  
(1)  Pr(bank failure)t = f{commercial bank work experience + bank director 
experience + accounting expertise + director tenure + control variables}t–1 
 
(2)  Pr(bank failure)t = f{commercial bank work experience + bank director 
experience + accounting expertise + director tenure + control variables}t–2 
 
(3)  Pr(bank failure)t = f{commercial bank work experience + bank director 
experience + accounting expertise + director tenure + control variables}t–3 
 
Commercial bank work experience (BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE) and 
commercial bank director experience (BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE) are represented as 
dummy variables, with 1 indicating the presence of at least one member of the board of 
directors with that type of experience and 0 indicating the absence of such experience. 
This information is assessed based on director biographies in each bank‘s (or bank 
holding company‘s) Form DEF 14A as filed with the SEC in the respective years. A 
director is deemed to have commercial bank work experience or commercial bank 
director experience (either previous or contemporaneous experience with respect to 
director service) if the director‘s biography includes a reference to previous work or 
director experience in commercial banking. In instances in which a director‘s bio 
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included a reference to a specific financial institution, every effort was made to verify 
that the institution in question is or was a commercial bank and not a savings bank, a 
cooperative bank, a credit union, an investment bank, or an industrial bank, because the 
operational characteristics of these types of financial institutions differ considerably from 
those of commercial banks. Given that work experience in the commercial banking 
industry—either as an employee or as a director—should provide a director with a 
heightened awareness of the types of activities that most often lead to bank failures, I 
expect a negative association between these variables and bank failure.  
A number of studies reported in recent years highlight the fact that the type of 
accounting expertise represented on a company‘s audit committee has implications for 
market perceptions (DeFond et al., 2005), accounting conservatism (Krishnan & 
Visvanathan, 2008), internal control quality (Krishnan, 2005), financial restatements 
(Abbott et al., 2004), and accruals quality (Dhaliwal et al., 2010). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to assume that the nature of the accounting expertise represented on a bank‘s 
board may have implications for bank failure. Moreover, given the fact that the audit 
committee is often accountable for the board‘s risk management responsibilities, the type 
of accounting expertise represented on a bank‘s audit committee may prove to be 
especially germane.  
Naiker and Sharma (2009) investigate how internal control over financial 
reporting quality is affected by the presence of former partners on the audit committee 
who are affiliated or unaffiliated with the firm‘s external auditor and find that both 
categories of former audit partners are negatively associated with the incidence of 
internal control deficiencies. Consistent with Naiker and Sharma, I measure accounting 
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expertise as board members possessing or having possessed a certified public accountant 
designation or public accounting experience (BOD_SPECACCTG_ ONE). I also employ 
an alternative definition of accounting expertise, per Naiker and Sharma, as follows: 
board members with work experience as a chief financial officer, vice president of 
finance, or controller (BOD_POTACCTG_ONE). As with the bank work experience and 
director experience variables, each of the accounting expertise variables will be 
empirically measured as 1 if the board has at least one director with that level of 
expertise, and 0 otherwise. In light of the professional knowledge and specialized 
expertise associated with each of the representations of accounting expertise, I would 
expect each to be negatively associated with bank failure. Following Sharma and Iselin 
(2012), director tenure will be defined as the average tenure of all board members 
(AVGBODTEN_DIR_YRS). Due to the conflicting theories associated with board tenure 
discussed earlier, I make no prediction for the association between board tenure and bank 
failure.  
Given that several of my hypotheses address the audit committee members as a 
result of their risk management responsibilities, each of the test variables associated with 
the board of directors—BANKWORK_EXP_ONE, BANKDIR_EXP_ONE, 
SPECACCTG_ONE, POTACCTG_ONE, AVGBODTEN_DIR_YRS—will also be 
investigated in relation to the members of the audit committee, as listed in Table 1. Note 
that the audit committee–level variables are simply preceded by ―AC‖ to denote that they 
relate to audit committee members, as opposed to the BOD that denotes board-level 
variables. In each case, the predicted associations between the audit committee–level 
variables and bank failure are the same as the predicted associations between the 
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corresponding board-level variables and bank failure. Since the tenure of members of the 
audit committee was rarely disclosed, the audit committee tenure variable is based on the 
directors‘ tenure on the board instead.  
Note also that each hypothesis is tested across three categories of directors: all 
directors, nonexecutive directors (those directors who are not executives of the bank in 
question), and independent directors (those directors who are not executives of the bank 
in question and who do not have business dealings with the bank sufficient to raise 
questions of independence with respect to the bank). Gray directors, those directors who 
are also nonexecutives of the bank but who have business relationships with the bank 
sufficient to prevent them from being considered independent, were excluded from 
consideration due to the fact that there were too few gray directors to perform analyses on 
this group of directors. 
In order to avoid confounding effects, I control for common board variables 
employed in previous studies on boards and firm performance, as listed and defined in 
Table 1 along with their expected directional associations. Note that in several cases I do 
not form any expectation about a variable‘s expected association with bank failure due to 
the inconsistent and inconclusive findings of previous research. I control for size of the 
board of directors (BODSIZE), the number of board meetings annually (BODMEET), 
CEO duality (DUALITY), and board independence
11
 (BODIND)—defined as the 
proportion of all board members who are independent. For both BODSIZE and 
BODMEET, I use the natural log to normalize the data. I expect a negative association 
                                                          
11
Independent directors are those whose only relationship with the firm involves their directorship. 
Independent directors are not current or former employees of the firm or members of their immediate 
families. Moreover, independent directors must not have any material relationship with the firm arising 
from their roles as investment bankers, commercial bankers, lawyers, consultants, or officers and directors 
of the firm‘s suppliers and customers.  
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between the number of board meetings per year and bank failure (Vafeas, 1999). 
However, I do not form any expectations with respect to the relationship among the size 
of the board, board independence, and duality, and bank failure as a result of conflicting 
empirical findings of prior studies.  
In addition, when testing audit committee–related variables, I also control for the 
size of the audit committee (ACSIZE)
12
 and form no expectation for the association 
between audit committee size and bank failure, again due to conflicting results in the 
literature.
13
  
When testing the audit committee–related variables for bank work experience, 
director experience, accounting expertise, and tenure, I control for the possibility of 
board-level variables for each of those test variables influencing the results. Specifically, 
when testing AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE, I control for potential effects of bank work 
experience being represented among non-AC board members (NONAC_BANKWORK_ 
EXP_ONE). When testing AC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE, I control for the possibility that 
bank director experience among non-AC board members (NONAC_BANKDIR_EXP_ 
ONE) may affect my results, and so on.  
Next, I control for a number of variables with directional predictions that have 
been shown in previous banking literature to be statistically significant in predicting bank 
failure. The Uniform Financial Rating System, informally known as the CAMELS ratings 
system, has been used by federal banking regulators for more than three decades as a 
means of assessing the health of individual banks. CAMELS is an acronym that 
                                                          
12
The number of audit committee meetings was not used as a control due to missing data in too many cases.  
13
One requirement of SOX is that insiders are no longer allowed to serve on the audit committee. Thus, the 
percentage of insiders serving on the audit committee who are independent of the CEO will not be 
examined.  
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represents Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and 
Sensitivity to market risks (Cole & Curry, 2011). Although I collected data on a total of 
26 financial ratios used in prior bank failure research, in order to have my models be as 
parsimonious as possible, I chose five CAMELS-focused ratios that have consistently 
been reported to be statistically significant (p < 0.05) in predicting bank failure in 
previous studies (see Antoniades, 2013; Avery & Hanweck, 1984; Berger, Imbierowicz, 
& Rauch, 2012; Cole & Curry, 2011; Cole & Gunther, 1995, 1998; Cole & White, 2012; 
DeYoung, 2003; Kerstein & Kozberg, 2013; Lane et al., 1986; Martin, 1977; Mayes & 
Stremmel, 2013; Nuxoll, 2003; Short, O‘Driscoll, & Berger, 1985; Sinkey, 1975; 
Thomson, 1991; West, 1985; Whalen, 1991; Wheelock & Wilson, 1995, 2000). 
Representing the capital adequacy dimension, I control for the ratio of total equity to total 
assets (EQUITYASSETS). Since this ratio is a measure of the adequacy of a bank‘s 
capital base, I expect a negative association between this measure and bank failure. Asset 
quality is measured by two ratios that have been shown in previous studies to be 
positively associated with bank failure. Specifically, I control for the ratio of adjusted 
nonperforming assets to total assets (ADJNPA). Adjusted nonperforming assets include 
loans past due 90+ days plus nonaccruing loans plus other real estate owned, which the 
OCC (2013) defines as real estate acquired through any means in full or partial 
satisfaction of a debt previously contracted; as a result, I expect it to be positively 
associated with bank failure. Because losses related to loans to commercial and industrial 
businesses have often been associated with bank failures (Cole & White, 2012), I also 
control for commercial and industrial loans as a percentage of total assets (C&I) and 
expect a positive association between this measure and bank failure. Earnings is 
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represented by the bank‘s return on assets (ROA), and I expect this measure to be 
negatively associated with bank failure. Liquidity is assessed via one ratio: the ratio of 
total loans to total assets (LOANS). I expect this variable to be positively related to bank 
failure.  
Note that I have excluded the management and sensitivity to market risks 
dimensions included in the CAMELS system. According to the FDIC‘s Risk Management 
Manual of Examination Policies, the management dimension involves a qualitative 
assessment of the 
capability of the board of directors and management, in their respective 
roles, to identify, measure, monitor, and control the risks of an 
institution‘s activities and to ensure a financial institution‘s safe, sound, 
and efficient operation in compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations. (FDIC, n.d., p. 4.1-14)  
Similarly, the sensitivity to market risks dimension includes a qualitative assessment of 
―the degree to which changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commodity prices, 
or equity prices can adversely affect a financial institution‘s earnings or economic 
capital‖ (p. 7.1-15). Since both the management and sensitivity to market risks 
components are qualitative assessments made by the bank examiner during the course of 
a bank examination, and these data are not publicly available, they are excluded from the 
study.  
The financial information necessary to calculate the CAEL elements and other 
control variables will be taken from the banks‘ Reports of Income and Condition 
(generally referred to as ―call reports‖) as filed with regulatory bodies. That information 
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is publicly available at the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council website 
(https://cdr.ffiec.gov/public/).  
Data Analysis  
Given that bank failure is a nonmetric, dichotomous (binary) dependent variable, I 
employ logistic regression analysis to test the study‘s hypotheses. Both logistic regression 
and discriminant analysis are appropriate statistical techniques when the dependent  
variable is categorical and the independent variables are either metric (normally the case 
for discriminant analysis) or nonmetric (Hair et al., 2010). However, there are instances 
in which logistic regression is considered superior to discriminant analysis. For instance, 
two key assumptions underlying discriminant analysis are multivariate normality of the 
independent variables and equal dispersion and covariance structures for the groups 
defined by the dependent variable. These assumptions are not always met. While logistic 
regression is identical to discriminant analysis in terms of the research objectives it can 
address, logistic regression is not predicated on the multivariate normality or equal 
variance assumptions and ―is much more robust when these assumptions are not met, 
making its application appropriate in many situations‖ (Hair et al., 2010, p. 319).  
In addition to not requiring the conditions upon which discriminant analysis is 
based, many researchers prefer logistic regression over discriminant analysis due to its 
similarities with multiple regression. According to Hair et al. (2010, p. 343), those 
similarities include ―straightforward statistical tests, similar approaches to incorporating 
metric and nonmetric variables and nonlinear effects, and a wide range of diagnostics.‖ 
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CHAPTER 4 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
Descriptive Statistics 
 The sample for this study was 65 failed banks that were registrants with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) at the time of their failure from 2008–2011 
and 65 nonfailed matching banks. Therefore, data were collected on 130 banks for one 
year before failure (Year 1), but due to missing data on failed banks the sample dropped 
to 128 banks in Year 2, and to 116 banks in Year 3. Frequencies and percentages for bank 
board characteristics by year are presented in Table 2. Approximately 38% of the banks 
in all three years had at least one director with bank work experience (BOD_ 
BANKWORK_ EXP _ONE), 33% had at least one director with bank director experience 
(BOD_ BANKDIR_ EXP_ONE), 44% had at least one director with special accounting 
experience (BOD_SPECACCTG_ONE), and 17% had at least one director with potential 
accounting experience (BOD_POTACCTG_ONE). Approximately, 26% of the banks in 
all three years had at least one nonexecutive director with bank work experience 
(BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE), 31% had at least one nonexecutive director 
with bank director experience (BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE), 44% had at 
least one nonexecutive director with special accounting experience (BOD_NONEX_ 
SPECACCTG_ONE), and 15% had at least one nonexecutive director with potential 
accounting experience (BOD_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE). Finally, 25% of banks had 
at least one independent director with bank work experience (BOD_INDEP_ 
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BANKWORK_EXP_ONE), 31% had at least one independent director with bank 
director experience (BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE), 42% had at least one 
independent director with special accounting experience (BOD_INDEP_ SPECACCTG_ 
ONE), and 15% of the banks had at least one independent director with potential 
accounting experience (BOD_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE).  
 
Table 2 
 
Frequencies and Percentages for Bank Board Characteristics 
 
 
Year 1 
(n = 130) 
Year 2 
(n = 128) 
Year 3 
(n = 116) 
Total 
(n = 374) 
Characteristic n % n % n % n % 
BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE 49 38 50 39 44 38 143 38 
BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE 36 28 32 25 28 24 96 26 
BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE 34 26 31 24 27 23 92 25 
BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE 44 34 42 33 39 34 125 33 
BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE 40 31 39 31 36 31 115 31 
BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE 40 31 39 31 35 30 114 31 
BOD_SPECACCTG_ONE 60 46 57 45 49 42 166 44 
BOD_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE 60 46 57 45 49 42 166 44 
BOD_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE 57 44 54 42 47 41 158 42 
BOD_POTACCTG_ONE 25 19 22 17 17 15 64 17 
BOD_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE 21 16 20 16 16 14 57 15 
BOD_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE 21 16 20 16 16 14 57 15 
 
 
 
 Chi-square tests were conducted to assess differences in the percentages of bank 
board characteristics by failure status. Table 3 presents the percentages of bank board 
characteristics by failure status. Significance was found for BOD_BANKWORK_ 
EXP_ONE for Year 1, as well as for both BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE 
and BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE for Years 1–3 (p < .05 for all tests). 
Results showed that a higher percentage of failed banks had directors with bank work 
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experience in Year 1. Additionally, there were higher percentages of failed banks with 
nonexecutive and independent directors with bank work experience in all three years. 
Data were also collected on directors serving on banks‘ audit committees. 
Frequencies and percentages for bank audit committee characteristics are presented in 
Table 4. Approximately 14% of banks had at least one audit committee director with 
bank work experience (AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE), 22% had at least one audit 
committee director with bank director experience (AC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE), 36% 
had at least one audit committee director with special accounting experience 
(AC_SPEACCTG_ONE), and 13% had at least one audit committee director with 
potential accounting experience (AC_POTACCTG_ONE). These percentages declined 
slightly for nonexecutive directors as follows: 13% of banks had at least one 
nonexecutive director on the audit committee with bank work experience (AC_NONEX_ 
BANKWORK _EXP_ONE), 21% had at least one nonexecutive director on the audit 
committee with bank director experience (AC_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE), 
36% had at least one nonexecutive director on the audit committee with special 
accounting experience (AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE), and 12% had at least one 
nonexecutive director on the audit committee with potential accounting experience 
(AC_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE). The same pattern continued with independent audit 
committee members as follows: 13% of the banks had at least one independent audit 
committee director with bank work experience (AC_INDEP_ BANKWORK_EXP_ 
ONE), 21% had at least one independent audit committee member with bank director 
experience (AC_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE), 35% had at least one independent 
audit committee member with special accounting experience (AC_INDEP_ 
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SPECACCTG_ONE), and 12% had at least one independent director on the audit 
committee with potential accounting experience (AC_INDEP_ POTACCTG_ ONE).  
Chi-square tests were also conducted to assess significant differences in bank 
audit committee characteristics by failure status. Table 5 presents the percentages 
separated by bank failure status. Significant differences in the chi-squares were found 
only for AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE in Years 1–3 (p < .05 for all). Percentages 
showed that a significantly higher percentage of failed banks had at least one audit 
committee director with bank work experience. 
Data were also collected on the tenure of all directors, nonexecutive directors, and 
independent directors both at the board level and also on the audit committee. Means and 
standard deviations for board and audit committee tenure are presented in Table 6. At the 
board level, tenure was at its lowest for independent directors in Year 3 (M = 9.56, SD = 
4.61), while it was at its highest for nonexecutive directors in Year 1 (M = 10.73, SD = 
4.65). For the audit committee, tenure was at its lowest for all directors in Year 3 (M = 
8.83, SD = 4.87), while it was at its highest for independent directors in Year 1 (M = 
9.67, SD = 4.94). Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the control variables.  
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Table 3 
 
Percentages for Bank Board Characteristics by Bank Failure Status  
 
 Year 1  
(n = 130) 
Year 2  
(n = 128) 
Year 3  
(n = 116) 
Total 
(n = 374) 
 
 
Characteristic 
Not 
failed 
(%) 
Failed 
(%) 
Not 
failed 
(%) 
Failed 
(%) 
Not 
failed 
(%) 
Failed 
(%) 
Not 
failed 
(%) 
Failed 
(%) 
BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE 29 46 31 47 29 47 30 47 
BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE 17 39 16 34 14 35 16 36 
BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE 14 39 14 34 12 35 13 36 
BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE 31 37 31 34 33 35 32 35 
BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE 29 32 30 31 31 31 30 32 
BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE 29 32 30 31 29 31 29 32 
BOD_SPECACCTG_ONE 43 49 44 45 41 43 43 46 
BOD_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE 43 49 44 45 41 43 43 46 
BOD_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE 42 46 42 42 40 41 41 43 
BOD_POTACCTG_ONE 22 17 20 14 16 14 19 15 
BOD_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE 19 14 17 14 12 16 16 14 
BOD_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE 19 14 17 14 12 16 16 14 
Percentages in bold are significantly different at p < .05 using a chi-square test. 
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Table 4 
 
Frequencies and Percentages for Bank Audit Committee Characteristics 
 
 Year 1  
(n = 130) 
Year 2  
(n = 128) 
Year 3  
(n = 116) 
Total 
(n = 374) 
Characteristic n % n % n % n % 
AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE 17 13 19 15 15 13 51 14 
AC_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE 16 12 18 14 15 13 49 13 
AC_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE 16 12 18 14 15 13 49 13 
AC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE 28 22 29 23 25 22 82 22 
AC_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE 27 21 26 20 24 21 77 21 
AC_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE 27 21 26 20 24 21 77 21 
AC_SPECACCTG_ONE 48 37 47 37 39 34 134 36 
AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE 48 37 47 37 39 34 134 36 
AC_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE 47 36 46 36 37 32 130 35 
AC_POTACCTG_ONE 17 13 17 13 13 11 47 13 
AC_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE 16 12 16 13 13 11 45 12 
AC_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE 16 12 16 13 13 11 45 12 
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Table 5 
 
Percentages for Bank Audit Committee Characteristics by Bank Failure Status 
 
 Year 1  
(n = 130) 
Year 2  
(n = 128) 
Year 3  
(n = 116) 
Total 
(n = 374) 
 
Characteristic 
Not 
Failed 
(%) 
Failed 
(%) 
Not 
Failed 
(%) 
Failed 
(%) 
Not 
Failed 
(%) 
Failed 
(%) 
Not 
Failed 
(%) 
Failed 
(%) 
AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE 5 22 5 25 5 21 5 23 
AC_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE 5 20 5 23 5 21 5 21 
AC_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE 5 20 5 23 5 21 5 21 
AC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE 20 23 20 25 19 24 20 24 
AC_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE 20 22 20 20 19 22 20 21 
AC_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE 20 22 20 20 19 22 20 21 
AC_SPECACCTG_ONE 35 39 36 38 33 35 35 37 
AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE 35 39 36 38 33 35 35 37 
AC_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE 35 37 36 36 33 31 35 35 
AC_POTACCTG_ONE 17 9 16 11 14 9 16 10 
AC_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE 17 8 16 9 14 9 16 9 
AC_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE 17 8 16 9 14 9 16 9 
Percentages in bold are significantly different between bank failure status at p < .05 using a chi-square test. 
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Table 6 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables Used in Models 
 
 Year 1  
(n = 130) 
Year 2  
(n = 128) 
Year 3  
(n = 116) 
Total 
(n = 374) 
Control variable M SD M SD M SD M SD 
EQUITY 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.02 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.03 
ADJNPA 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 
C&I 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.08 
ROA –0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 
LOANS 0.78 0.73 0.75 0.10 0.74 0.11 0.76 0.44 
BODSIZE.log 2.29 0.28 2.31 0.27 2.31 0.27 2.30 0.27 
BODIND 0.76 0.16 0.79 0.13 0.79 0.12 0.78 0.14 
DUALITY 0.27 0.45 0.29 0.46 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.45 
BODMEET.log 2.34 0.78 2.38 0.55 2.31 0.61 2.35 0.66 
ACSIZE 3.90 1.39 4.10 1.13 3.93 1.28 3.98 1.27 
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 Tables 7 and 8 examine differences in board and audit committee tenure as well 
as control variables used in the model by bank failure status. Significant differences were 
found in the average board tenure for Years 1 and 2 (p < .05), suggesting that banks with 
directors with longer average tenure were less likely to fail than banks with directors with 
shorter average tenure in those years. Similarly, significance was also found for 
nonexecutive directors‘ tenure for Years 1 and 2, with the average tenure of these 
directors being significantly higher for those that were in nonfailed banks. Significance 
was found for independent directors only in Year 1.  
 The test variables and control variables were examined for multicollinearity using 
Spearman correlations because the variables are continuous and categorical. The matrix 
was examined for all three years combined. Correlations with coefficients larger than .80 
suggest the presence of multicollinearity (Gujarati, 2003). When examining the 
correlation matrix, the only correlations that were above the .80 mark were between test 
variables that would never appear in the same model. No correlation coefficients existed 
between the control variables and the test variables that were above .80, nor were there 
correlation coefficients above .80 among the control variables. Results of the correlations 
are presented in Table 9.  
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Table 7 
 
Means for Board and Audit Committee Tenure by Bank Failure Status 
 
 Year 1  
(n = 130) 
Year 2  
(n = 128) 
Year 3  
(n = 116) 
Total 
(n = 374) 
 
Characteristic 
Not 
failed 
(M) 
Failed 
(M) 
Not 
failed 
(M) 
Failed 
(M) 
Not 
failed 
(M) 
Failed 
(M) 
Not 
failed 
(M) 
Failed 
(M) 
AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS 11.69 9.65 10.82 9.22 10.36 8.99 10.98 9.30 
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS 11.69 9.74 10.79 9.11 10.35 8.79 10.97 9.23 
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS 11.56 9.86 10.69 9.18 10.26 8.84 10.86 9.31 
ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS 9.63 9.09 9.87 8.89 9.34 8.32 9.62 8.78 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS 10.03 9.29 9.96 9.00 9.64 8.36 9.85 8.90 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS  10.04 9.31 9.96 9.02 9.64 8.37 9.86 8.92 
Means in bold are significantly different between bank failure status at p < .05 using an independent sample t-test.  
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Table 8 
 
Means for Control Variables Used in Models by Bank Failure Status 
 
 Year 1 
(n = 130) 
Year 2 
(n = 128) 
Year 3 
(n = 116) 
Total 
(n = 374) 
Control 
Variable  
Not failed 
(M) 
Failed 
(M) 
Not failed 
(M) 
Failed 
(M) 
Not failed 
(M) 
Failed 
(M) 
Not failed 
(M) 
Failed 
(M) 
EQUITY 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 
ADJNPA 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 
C&I 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 
ROA 0.00 –0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 –0.01 
LOANS 0.70 0.87 0.72 0.79 0.71 0.78 0.71 0.81 
BODSIZE.log 2.34 2.25 2.35 2.26 2.35 2.27 2.35 2.26 
BODIND 0.75 0.77 0.80 0.79 0.80 0.79 0.78 0.78 
DUALITY* 0.20 0.34 0.20 0.38 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.37 
BODMEET.log 2.13 2.56 2.29 2.47 2.24 2.38 2.22 2.47 
ACSIZE 3.97 3.83 4.30 3.91 3.95 3.91 4.07 3.88 
Means in bold are significantly different between bank failure status at p < .05 using paired sample t-test.  
*Duality had a chi-square test conducted as it is a dichotomous variable.
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Table 9 
 
Correlation Matrix for Test and Control Variables 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
EQUITY (1) –             
ADJNPA (2) –.33 –            
C&I (3) .14 –.04 –           
ROA (4) .39 –.62 .04 –          
LOANS (5) .03 –.07 .20 .07 –         
BODSIZE.log (6) .06 –.02 .12 –.03 –.09 –        
BODIND (7) .00 –.04 .07 .02 .05 .21 –       
DUALITY (8) –.09 .12 –.02 –.07 –.03 –.22 –.20 –      
BODMEET.log (9) –.13 .19 –.01 –.13 .05 –.06 –.02 –.18 –     
AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE (10) .03 .15 –.03 –.14 .00 .04 –.16 .13 –.01 –    
AC_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE (11) .03 .14 –.05 –.14 –.02 .04 –.16 .12 .00 .98 –   
AC_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE (12) .03 .14 –.05 –.14 –.02 .00 –.16 .12 .00 .98 1.00 –  
AC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE (13) .10 .00 –.15 .04 .03 .01 –.01 –.02 .01 .07 .01 .01 – 
AC_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE (14) –.01 .01 .02 .08 .02 –.03 –.05 .01 .25 .07 .01 .01 .09 
AC_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE (15) –.01 .01 .02 .08 .02 –.03 –.05 .01 .25 .07 –.04 –.04 .09 
AC_SPECACCTG_ONE (16) .06 .02 .14 –.04 .03 .20 .05 .02 .05 .06 .05 .05 .02 
Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in bold. (continued) 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE (17) .06 .02 .14 –.04 .03 .20 .05 .02 .05 .06 .06 .06 .02 
AC_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE (18) .07 .01 .12 –.02 .02 .20 .08 .03 .04 .07 .06 .06 .01 
AC_POTACCTG_ONE (19) –.02 .04 .07 .02 –.03 –.04 .07 –.04 .04 .04 .07 .07 .07 
AC_NONEXEC_POTACCTG_ONE (20) –.02 .03 .05 .01 –.04 –.06 .08 –.03 .03 .04 .04 .04 .04 
AC_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE (21) –.02 .03 .05 .01 –.04 –.06 .08 –.03 .03 .04 .05 .05 .04 
AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS (22) –.01 .13 –.14 .15 –.14 –.11 –.08 .04 .04 –.18 .05 .05 –.21 
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS (23) –.05 .13 –.09 .12 –.06 –.05 –.05 .02 .12 –.17 –.16 –.16 –.19 
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS (24) –.08 .14 –.09 .11 –.05 –.06 –.08 .03 .13 –.16 –.15 –.15 –.19 
ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS (25) –.05 .11 –.08 .11 –.06 .01 –.03 .06 .11 –.11 –.14 –.14 –.18 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS (26) –.05 .10 –.07 .11 –.05 .00 –.05 .05 .10 –.12 –.09 –.09 –.19 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS (27) –.05 .10 –.07 .11 –.05 .00 –.06 .05 .11 –.12 –.11 –.11 –.19 
Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in bold. (continued) 
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Table 9 (continued) 
 
 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
AC_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE (15) 1.00 –            
AC_SPECACCTG_ONE (16) .01 .01 –           
AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE (17) .01 .01 1.00 –          
AC_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE (18) –.01 –.01 .98 .98 –         
AC_POTACCTG_ONE (19) .05 .05 .02 .02 .03 –        
AC_NONEXEC_POTACCTG_ONE (20) .06 .06 .00 .00 .01 .98 –       
AC_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE (21) .06 .06 .00 .00 .01 .98 1.00 –      
AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS (22) –.21 –.21 –.13 –.13 –.11 .00 .01 .01 –     
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS (23) –.19 –.19 –.11 –.11 –.09 .00 .01 .01 .94 –    
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS (24) –.19 –.19 –.11 –.11 –.10 –.01 .01 .01 .93 .99 –   
ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS (25) –.18 –.18 –.07 –.07 –.06 –.01 .00 .00 .82 .84 .83 –  
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS (26) –.20 –.20 –.08 –.08 –.07 –.01 –.01 –.01 .84 .87 .87 .97 – 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS (27) –.20 –.20 –.08 –.08 –.07 –.01 –.01 –.01 .84 .87 .87 .97 1.00 
Coefficients significant at the 5% level are in bold.  
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 To examine Hypotheses 1–4, a series of binary logistic regressions were estimated 
for each year to assess if bank work experience, bank director experience, the two levels 
of accounting expertise of interest in this study, and the interactions of these variables 
were significant in predicting bank failure. EQUITY, ADJNPA, C&I, ROA, LOANS, 
(log) BODSIZE, BODIND, DUALITY, and (log) BODMEET were used as control 
variables for the analyses. All omnibus chi-square tests of model coefficients ranged in 
chi-square values from 32.16 to 107.71 and were significant at the p < .01 level. Cox & 
Snell R
2
 values ranged from .24 to .56 among the models for Hypotheses 1–4, with 71–
88% of bank failures being correctly predicted by the models. Table 10 presents the 
results from the logistic regressions for Hypotheses 1–4.  
 Control variables in the model were tested first with the test variables present. 
Positive relationships with bank failure (at the p < .05 level) were found for ADJNPA 
(Year 1) and LOANS (Years 1–3). Significant, negative relationships with bank failure 
(at the p < .05 level) were found for EQUITY (Year 1) and ROA (Year 3). For brevity‘s 
sake, the control variables were not tabulated in the full models with the test variables 
present.  
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Table 10 
 
Results for Logistic Regression Testing of Hypotheses 1–4 
 
  
Expected 
Sign 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Variable 
B χ2 B χ2 B χ2 
H1        
BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE – 1.28 4.73** 0.63 1.80 0.91 3.34* 
BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE – 1.78 7.40*** 0.88 2.90* 1.24 4.96** 
BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE – 0.60 0.96 0.13 0.07 –0.17 0.12 
H2        
BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE – 0.56 0.87 0.21 0.21 –0.06 0.02 
BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE – 0.60 0.96 0.13 0.07 –0.21 0.19 
BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE – 0.60 0.96 0.13 0.07 –0.17 0.12 
H3        
BOD_SPECACCTG_ONE – 0.52 0.91 –0.04 0.01 –0.15 0.11 
BOD_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE – 0.42 0.59 0.02 0.00 –0.08 0.03 
BOD_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE – 0.45 0.66 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 
BOD_POTACCTG_ONE – –0.63 0.71 –0.60 1.00 –0.38 0.38 
BOD_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE – –0.86 1.06 –0.66 1.02 0.07 0.01 
BOD_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE – –0.87 1.08 –0.66 1.02 0.08 0.01 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Control variables are not shown. (continued) 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
 
Expected 
Sign 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
 
Variable 
B χ2 B χ2 B χ2 
H4        
BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE*BOD_SPECACCTG_
ONE 
 
– 
 
–1.72 
 
1.96 
 
–1.37 
 
1.84 
 
0.39 
 
0.15 
BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP
_ONE*BOD_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE 
 
– 
 
–1.24 
 
1.14 
 
–1.02 
 
1.54 
 
0.13 
 
0.02 
BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP
_ONE*BOD_INDEP_ SPECACCTG_ONE 
 
– 
 
–1.63 
 
2.13 
 
–1.32 
 
2.59 
 
–0.09 
 
0.01 
BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE*BOD_POTACCTG
_ONE 
 
– 
 
–0.55 
 
0.12 
 
0.13 
 
0.01 
 
0.02 
 
0.00 
BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP
_ONE*BOD_NONEXEC_ POTACCTG_ONE 
 
– 
 
–1.45 
 
0.56 
 
–0.12 
 
0.01 
 
–0.91 
 
0.42 
BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP
_ONE*BOD_INDEP_ POTACCTG_ONE 
 
– 
 
–0.91 
 
0.22 
 
1.25 
 
0.59 
 
0.07 
 
0.00 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Control variables are not shown. 
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Hypothesis 1 examined bank work experience in connection with bank failure. 
Significance was found at the board level in Year 1 (B = 1.28, p < .050) and Year 3 (B = 
0.91, p < .100), suggesting that banks having at least one director, regardless of whether 
the director is an executive, nonexecutive, or independent, with previous bank work 
experience were more likely to fail than banks without the presence of such directors on 
their boards. Positive relationships were also found for nonexecutive directors with bank 
work experience in Year 1 (B = 1.78, p < .010), Year 2 (B = 0.88, p < .10), and Year 3 
(B = 1.24, p < .050), again suggesting that the presence of a nonexecutive director with 
bank work experience on a bank‘s board was more likely to lead to bank failure than if 
such directors were not present on the board. No results were significant for independent 
directors. Although significance was found, given that the results indicated positive 
relationships instead of negative ones, Hypothesis 1 was not supported.  
 Hypothesis 2 examined bank failure in the context of boards with bank director 
experience. However, no significance was found for the relationship between bank 
director experience and bank failure at the board level, for nonexecutive directors, or for 
independent directors. However, the signs of the Betas were negative, as predicted, for all 
three categories of directors in Year 3. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was not supported.  
 Hypothesis 3 examined the presence of the special accounting and potential 
accounting experience variables and their relationships to bank failure. Again, no 
significant relationships were found between special accounting experience and bank 
failure or between potential accounting experience and bank failure. However, it is 
interesting to note that the signs of the Betas were negative, as predicted, in three of nine 
instances for special accounting experience and negative in seven of nine instances for 
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potential accounting experience. Nevertheless, since no significant relationships were 
found, Hypothesis 3 also was not supported.  
 Hypothesis 4 predicted that the interaction of bank work experience, bank director 
experience, and special accounting experience or potential accounting experience would 
be more significant in reducing the likelihood of bank failure than the presence of only 
one of those variables. However, no significant results were found for the interactions, 
and thus Hypothesis 4 was not supported. It is worth noting that the signs of the Betas 
were negative, as predicted, in 12 of 18 cases.  
 To examine Hypotheses 5–7, a series of binary logistic regressions were estimated 
for each year to assess if average tenure of the board members and the interactions among 
average board tenure, bank work experience, and the two categories of accounting 
expertise were related to bank failure. EQUITY, ADJNPA, C&I, ROA, LOANS, (log) 
BODSIZE, BODIND, DUALITY, and (log) BODMEET were used as control variables 
for the analyses. All omnibus chi-square tests of model coefficients ranged in chi-square 
values from 33.38 to 105.44 and were significant at the p < .01 level. Cox & Snell R
2
 
values ranged from .25 to .56 among the models for Hypotheses 5–7, with 72–90% of 
bank failures being correctly predicted by the models. Results of the logistic regressions 
for Hypotheses 5–7 are presented in Table 11. 
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Table 11 
 
Results for Logistic Regression Testing of Hypotheses 5–7 
 
 
Expected 
Sign 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Variable B χ2 B χ2 B χ2 
H5        
AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS  +/– –0.17 6.15** –0.12 4.61** –0.06 1.20 
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS  +/– –0.17 5.42** –0.14 6.07** –0.08 2.46 
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS  +/– –0.16 5.20** –0.14 6.08** –0.08 2.40 
        
H6        
AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS*BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE +/– –0.44 5.78** –0.31 5.84** –0.29 4.73** 
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS*BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE +/– –0.52 5.81** –0.23 2.77* –0.31 3.81* 
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS*BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE +/– –0.54 5.33** –0.15 1.09 –0.29 2.66 
        
H7        
AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS*BOD_SPECACCTG_ONE +/– 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.29 
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS*BOD_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE +/– 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.45 
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS*BOD_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE +/– –0.05 0.11 –0.01 0.01 0.03 0.07 
AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS*BOD_POTACCTG_ONE +/– –0.41 1.66 –0.38 2.23 –0.19 0.87 
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS*BOD_NONEXEC_POTACCTG_ONE +/– –0.66 3.43* –0.28 1.55 –0.15 0.58 
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS*BOD_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE +/– –0.70 3.90** –0.29 1.60 –0.16 0.71 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Control variables are not shown. 
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 Control variables in the model were tested first without the test variables present. 
Positive relationships with bank failure (at the p < .05 level) were found for ADJNPA 
(Year 1) and LOANS (Years 1–3). Significant, negative relationships with bank failure 
(at the p < .05 level) were found for EQUITY (Year 1) and ROA (Year 3). For brevity‘s 
sake, the control variables were not tabulated in the full models with the test variables 
present.  
Hypothesis 5 examined the relationship between board tenure and bank failure 
and predicted there would be no discernible relationship between tenure and failure. 
Results showed significant, negative relationships between average tenure for the entire 
board for Year 1 (B = –0.17, p < .05) and in Year 2 (B = –0.12, p < .05), suggesting that 
as the average tenure of directors increased, the likelihood of bank failure tended to 
decrease. Significant, negative relationships were also found for nonexecutive directors 
for Year 1 (B = –0.17, p < .05) and Year 2 (B = –0.14, p < .05), as well as for independent 
directors in Year 1 (B = –0.16, p < .10) and Year 2 (B = –0.14, p < .05). In short, these 
results suggest that as board tenure increases, the likelihood of bank failure decreases. 
Because there were significant associations found, the null form of Hypothesis 5 was 
rejected.  
 Hypothesis 6 examined the interaction between director tenure and directors with 
previous bank work experience and the likelihood of bank failure. Results showed 
significant negative relationships at the total board level in Year 1 (B = –0.44, p < .05), 
Year 2 (B = –0.31, p < .05), and Year 3 (B = –0.29, p < .05). This suggests that during all 
three years, as the tenure of the directors with bank experience increased, the likelihood 
for failure tended to decrease. Significant, negative relationships were also obtained for 
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nonexecutive directors with bank work experience in Year 1 (B = –0.52, p < .05), Year 2 
(B = –0.23, p < .10), and Year 3 (B = –0.31, p < .10). However, the interaction between 
tenure of independent directors and bank work experience was negative in all three years 
but was significant only in Year 1 (B = –0.54, p < .05). Because significant relationships 
were found and Hypothesis 6 was stated in the null form, this hypothesis was rejected.  
 Hypothesis 7 examined the relationship between tenure of directors with 
accounting expertise and bank failure. Significance was found only for nonexecutive and 
independent directors with potential accounting experience and only in Year 1 (for 
nonexecutive directors: B = –0.66, p < .10; for independent directors: B = –0.70, p < .05), 
suggesting that as the tenure of nonexecutive and independent directors with potential 
accounting experience increased, the likelihood for failure tended to decrease. Again, 
because significant results were found, the null form of Hypothesis 7 was rejected.  
 To examine Hypotheses 8–11, a series of binary logistic regressions was 
estimated for each year to assess whether the presence of banking experience, bank 
director experience, and the two levels of accounting expertise on the audit committee, as 
well as the interactions of these variables, was significantly related to bank failure. 
EQUITY, ADJNPA, C&I, ROA, LOANS, (log) BODSIZE, BODIND, DUALITY, and 
(log) BODMEET were used as control variables for the analyses. Additionally, ACSIZE, 
NONAC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE (H8), NONAC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE (H9), 
NONAC_SPECACCTG_ONE (H10), and NONAC_POTACCTG_ONE (H10) were 
used as controls where appropriate. The NONAC variables for bank work experience, 
bank director experience, special accounting expertise, and potential accounting expertise 
were introduced as additional control variables for each of the audit committee–related 
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hypotheses to control for the existence, if present, of each of these variables represented 
at the board level. All omnibus chi-square tests of model coefficients ranged in chi-square 
values from 32.20 to 103.10 and were significant at the p < .01 level. Cox & Snell R
2
 
values ranged from .24 to .55 for the models for Hypotheses 8–11, with 71–89% of bank 
failures being correctly predicted by the models. Results for Hypotheses 8–11 are 
presented in Table 12.  
Control variables in the model were tested first without the test variables present. 
Positive relationships with bank failure (at the p < .05 level) were found for ADJNPA 
(Year 1), LOANS (Years 1–3), duality (Years 1–3), and BOODMEET.log (Year 1). A 
significant, negative relationship with bank failure (at the p < .05 level) was found for 
EQUITY in Year 1.  
Hypothesis 8 examined bank work experience for audit committee members and 
the corresponding relationship with bank failure. Results showed significant positive 
relationships for audit committee members with bank work experience in Year 1 (B = 
3.93, p < .01), Year 2 (B = 1.57, p < .05), and Year 3 (B = 1.46, p < .10). These results 
suggest that if a bank had an audit committee director with bank work experience, the 
bank was more likely to fail than otherwise. Positive relationships were also found for 
nonexecutive directors in Year 1 (B = 3.93, p < .01), Year 2 (B = 1.48, p < .10), and Year 
3 (B = 1.46, p < .10), and also for independent directors in Year 1 (B = 3.93, p < .01), 
Year 2 (B = 1.48, p < .10), and Year 3 (B = 1.46, p < .10). However, since the results 
showed positive relationships, Hypothesis 8 was not supported.  
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Table 12 
 
Results for Logistic Regression Testing of Hypotheses 8–11 
 
 
Expected 
Sign 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Variable B χ2 B χ2 B χ2 
H8        
AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE – 3.93 9.69*** 1.57 4.31** 1.46 3.06* 
AC_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE – 3.93 9.69*** 1.48 3.71* 1.46 3.06* 
AC_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE – 3.93 9.69*** 1.48 3.71* 1.46 3.06* 
H9        
AC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE – 1.66 3.44* 0.61  0.82 0.13  0.05 
AC_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE – 1.36 2.53 0.04 0.00 –0.08 0.02 
AC_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE – 1.36 2.53 0.04 0.00 –0.08 0.02 
H10        
AC_SPECACCTG_ONE – 0.62 0.62 –0.07 0.47 0.10 0.04 
AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE – 0.55 0.64 –0.09 0.04 0.10 0.04 
AC_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE – 0.53 0.66 –0.16 0.11 0.01 0.00 
AC_POTACCTG_ONE – –1.77 3.74* –0.88 1.74 –0.71 0.84 
AC_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE – –2.24 5.51** –1.23 2.92* –0.71 0.84 
AC_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE – –2.25 5.12** –1.22 2.90* –0.70 0.83 
H11: COULD NOT BE TESTED (see text for details)         
*, **, and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Control variables are not shown. 
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 Hypothesis 9 examined the relationship between bank director experience 
represented on a bank‘s audit committee and bank failure. Results showed a positive and 
statistically significant result at the audit committee level only in Year 1 (B = 1.66, p < 
.10). These results suggest that the likelihood of failure increased if at least one director 
on the audit committee had bank director experience, but only in Year 1. However, since 
the results reflected positive relationships, Hypothesis 9 was not supported. 
 Hypothesis 10 examined the relationship between the two categories of 
accounting expertise represented on a bank‘s audit committee and bank failure. For 
directors with potential accounting expertise, there were significant and negative 
relationships at the audit committee level in Year 1 (B = –1.77, p < .10), for nonexecutive 
directors on the audit committee in Year 1 (B = –2.24, p < .05), and also for independent 
directors on the audit committee in Year 1 (B = –2.25, p <.05). Significant results were 
also obtained for nonexecutive directors (B = –1.23, p <.10) and independent directors 
(B = –1.22, p < .05) in Year 2. Interestingly, with respect to the presence of the 
SPECACCTG variable on the audit committee, none of those results were significant. In 
short, these findings suggest that the presence of nonexecutive and independent directors 
with potential accounting experience on a bank‘s audit committee indicates a bank was 
less likely to fail. Because several of the relationships were negative and significant, 
partial support for Hypothesis 10 was obtained.  
 Hypothesis 11 proposed that the interaction among audit committee directors with 
bank work experience, bank director experience, and the two categories of accounting 
expertise would result in a lower likelihood of failure than the presence of only one of 
those characteristics on the audit committee. However, when the interactions were added 
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into the model, the results could not be estimated as there were too few directors 
possessing all three of the characteristics. The maximum number of audit committee 
directors possessing all three characteristics was three in Year 2. Consequently, 
Hypothesis 11 could not be evaluated.  
 To examine Hypotheses 12–14, a series of binary logistic regressions was 
estimated for each year to assess whether the average tenure of audit committee 
members, the average tenure of directors on the audit committee with bank work 
experience, and the average tenure of directors on the audit committee with either of the 
two categories of accounting expertise were negatively related to bank failure. EQUITY, 
ADJNPA, C&I, ROA, LOANS, (log) BODSIZE, BODIND, DUALITY, and (log) 
BODMEET were used as control variables for the analyses. Additionally, the following 
additional variables were used as controls where appropriate: ACSIZE; the NONAC 
variables for BANKWORK_ EXP _ONE, BANKDIR_EXP_ONE, POTACCTG_ONE, 
SPECACCTG_ONE; and the NONAC AVGBODTEN variables for NONAC directors, 
NONAC nonexecutive directors, and NONAC independent directors. All omnibus chi-
square tests of model coefficients ranged in chi-square values from 33.49 to 119.36 and 
were significant at the p < .01 level. Cox & Snell R
2
 values ranged from .25 to .61 among 
the models for Hypotheses 12–14, with 70–91% of bank failures being correctly 
predicted by the models. Results for logistic regressions for Hypotheses 12–14 are 
presented in Table 13.  
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Table 13 
 
Results for Logistic Regression Testing of Hypotheses 12–14 
 
 
Expected 
Sign 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
Variable B χ2 B χ2 B χ2 
H12        
ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS  +/– –0.13 3.36* 0.11 3.56* –0.06 1.29 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS  +/– –0.12 2.31 –0.12 3.53* –0.08 2.28 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS  +/– –0.12 2.38 –0.12 3.73* –0.08 2.30 
        
H13        
ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS*AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE +/– 0.33 6.02** 0.07 0.71 0.08 0.60 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS*AC_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE +/– 0.40 7.55*** 0.05 0.32 0.07 0.54 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS*AC_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE +/– 0.40 7.49*** 0.05 0.31 0.07 0.55 
        
H14        
ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS*AC_SPECACCTG_ONE +/– –0.21 1.53 –0.19 2.77* –0.08 0.46 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS*AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE +/– –0.33 3.13* –0.25 3.77* –0.07 0.42 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS *AC_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE +/– –0.35 3.45* –0.24 3.55* –0.06 0.28 
ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS*AC_POTACCTG_ONE +/– –0.82 2.59 –0.39 2.16 –0.13 0.33 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS*AC_NONEXEC_POTACCTG_ONE +/– –1.03 3.04* –0.40 1.91 –0.13 0.33 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEP_YRS*AC_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE +/– –1.00 2.78* –0.38 1.79 –0.12 0.32 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. Control variables are not shown. 
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 Control variables in the model were tested first with the test variables present. 
Positive relationships with bank failure (at the p < .05 level) were found for ADJNPA 
(Year 1), LOANS (Years 1–3), duality (Year 2), and BODMEET.log (Years 1 and 2). A 
significant, negative relationship with bank failure (at the p < .05 level) was found only 
for ROA (Year 3) and NONAC_AVGBODTEN_NONACDIR (Year 1).  
Hypothesis 12 examined the relationship between audit committee tenure and 
bank failure. Results showed significant relationships at the audit committee level both in 
Year 1 (B = –0.13, p < .10) and Year 2 (B = 0.11, p < .10). Note that the relationship was 
negative in Year 1 but was positive in Year 2 at the audit committee level. There were 
also statistically significant negative relationships for nonexecutive and independent 
directors on the audit committee in Year 2 (nonexecutive directors: B = –0.12, p < .10; 
independent directors: B = –0.12, p < .10). Since Hypothesis 12 was stated in the null 
form, it was rejected.  
 Hypothesis 13 examined the interaction between the tenure of audit committee 
members with bank work experience and the corresponding relationship with bank 
failure. A positive and significant relationship was noted in Year 1 at the audit committee 
level (B = 0.33, p < .05). This finding suggests that as the tenure of audit committee 
directors with bank work experience increased, the likelihood of failure also tended to 
increase. There were significant, positive results for both nonexecutive and independent 
directors in Year 2 (nonexecutive directors: B = 0.40, p < .01; independent directors: B = 
0.40, p < .01). Again, since this hypothesis was stated in its null form, it was rejected.  
 Hypothesis 14 examined the interaction between the tenure of audit committee 
members with either of the two levels of accounting expertise and the corresponding 
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relationship with bank failure. Results of the logistic regressions reflect significant and 
negative relationships for both nonexecutive directors and independent directors with 
SPECACCTG experience for each of the two years leading up to failure, and negative 
relationships for both nonexecutive and independent directors with POTACCTG 
experience in Year 1. See Table 13 for the full results for Hypothesis 14. Since 
significant results were found, the null for of Hypothesis 14 is rejected.  
Supplemental Analysis  
 In sensitivity tests, I also employed additional financial ratios that have been 
demonstrated in previous research to be reliable predictors of bank failure. For the capital 
adequacy dimension, I also controlled for risk-weighted assets to equity; for asset quality, 
I also controlled for nonperforming assets to total assets; for loan portfolio mix, I also 
controlled for consumer loans to total assets; and for earnings I also controlled for return 
on equity. Controlling for these additional variables did not affect my results.  
 In addition, in other sensitivity tests, I also controlled for whether or not the bank 
was headquartered in one of the states with the four highest levels of bank failure during 
the review period. My results were robust when I controlled for the ―top 4 failure state‖ 
variable. I also controlled for a number of other factors associated with the type of audit 
firm, the audit firm‘s tenure with the bank, the audit fees paid by the bank, nonaudit fees 
paid by the bank, and stock market listing. An argument could be made that the 
magnitude of audit fees paid by a bank to its audit firm could be positively associated 
with audit quality or at least the level of effort extended by the audit firm. When I 
controlled for the log of the audit fees paid by the bank, that variable was not significant 
and did not affect my findings. Similarly, whether the audit firm was a local, regional, or 
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national public accounting firm could also affect the quality of audit services rendered. 
Nevertheless, when I controlled for the type of audit firm, this control variable was not 
significant and did not affect my findings. I also controlled for the possibility that the 
magnitude of nonaudit fees paid by the bank to the audit firm could have affected the 
professional judgment of the audit firm‘s personnel. However, the log of nonaudit fees 
was not significant and did not affect my results. Finally, I also controlled for the 
possibility that the stock market listing of a bank could affect the degree of scrutiny 
applied to the audit by the audit firm personnel. When I controlled for stock market 
listing, however, the result was not significant and my findings were robust.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
 The purpose of this study, believed to be the first of its kind, was to investigate 
how select characteristics of directors on a bank‘s board and its audit committee are 
related to the bank‘s likelihood of failure. I focused on the following director 
characteristics: previous commercial bank work experience, service on the board of 
another commercial bank (either previous or contemporaneous service), two categories of 
accounting expertise employed in previous research (Naiker & Sharma, 2009), tenure on 
the board, and the interaction effects of certain of these predictor variables. Each 
hypothesis was tested at the board and audit committee levels for all directors as well as 
both nonexecutive directors and independent directors.  
 Table 14 provides the summary results for the logistic regression testing of each 
of the hypotheses included in this study. For directional hypotheses, a hypothesis is 
considered supported if the relevant coefficient is statistically significant and its sign is in 
the anticipated direction. These are indicated by ―S‖ and the appropriate number of 
asterisks (*, **, or ***) depending on the significance level. For null hypotheses, a 
hypothesis is considered supported only if statistically significant results are not 
obtained—regardless of the sign. For a null hypothesis that has a statistically significant 
test result, the initials ―NS‖ indicate not supported followed by the obtained sign of the 
relevant coefficient (+ or –) and asterisks indicating level of significance. 
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Table 14 
 
Summary Results of Logistic Regression Testing of Hypotheses 1–14  
 
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
H1     
BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE  – NS** NS NS* 
BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE – NS*** NS* NS** 
BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE – NS NS NS 
H2     
BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE – NS NS NS 
BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE – NS NS NS 
BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE – NS NS NS 
H3     
BOD_SPECACCTG_ONE – NS NS NS 
BOD_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE – NS NS NS 
BOD_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE – NS NS NS 
BOD_POTACCTG_ONE – NS NS NS 
BOD_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE – NS NS NS 
BOD_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE – NS NS NS 
H4     
BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE*BOD_SPECACCTG_ONE – NS NS NS 
BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE*BOD_NONEX
_SPECACCTG_ONE 
 
– 
 
NS 
 
NS 
 
NS 
BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE*BOD_INDEP_ 
SPECACCTG_ONE 
 
– 
 
NS 
 
NS 
 
NS 
BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE*BOD_POTACCTG_ONE – NS NS NS 
BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE*BOD_NONEX          
_ POTACCTG_ONE 
 
– NS NS NS 
BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE*BOD_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE*BOD_INDEP_ 
POTACCTG_ONE 
 
– 
 
NS 
 
NS 
 
NS 
S = Supported; NS = Not Supported  (continued) 
*, **, and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 14 (continued)  
  
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
H5    
AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS  +/– NS, –** NS, –** S 
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS  +/– NS, –** NS, –** S 
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS  +/– NS, –** NS, –** S 
H6     
AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS*BOD_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE +/– NS, –** NS, –** NS, –** 
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS*BOD_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE +/– NS, –** NS, –* NS, –* 
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS*BOD_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE +/– NS, –** S S 
H7     
AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS*BOD_SPECACCTG_ONE +/– S S S 
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS*BOD_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE +/– S S S 
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS*BOD_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE +/– S S S 
AVGBODTEN_DIRECTORS_YRS*BOD_POTACCTG_ONE +/– S S S 
AVGBODTEN_NONEX_YRS*BOD_NONEXEC_POTACCTG_ONE +/– NS, –* S S 
AVGBODTEN_INDEP_YRS*BOD_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE +/– NS, –** S S 
H8     
AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE – NS*** NS** NS* 
AC_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE – NS*** NS* NS* 
AC_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE – NS*** NS* NS* 
H9     
AC_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE – NS* NS NS 
AC_NONEX_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE – NS NS NS 
AC_INDEP_BANKDIR_EXP_ONE – NS NS NS 
S = Supported; NS = Not Supported   
*, **, and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
   (continued) 
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Table 14 (continued)  
  
Variable 
Expected 
Sign 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 
H10     
AC_SPECACCTG_ONE – NS NS NS 
AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE – NS NS NS 
AC_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE – NS NS NS 
AC_POTACCTG_ONE – S* NS NS 
AC_NONEX_POTACCTG_ONE – S** NS* NS 
AC_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE – S** NS* NS 
     
H11 – COULD NOT BE TESTED (see text for details)      
H12     
ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS  +/– NS, –* NS, +* S 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS  +/– S NS, –* S 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS  +/– S NS, –* S 
H13     
ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS*AC_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE +/– NS, +** S S 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS*AC_NONEX_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE +/– NS, +*** S S 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS*AC_INDEP_BANKWORK_EXP_ONE +/– NS, +*** S S 
H14     
ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS*AC_SPECACCTG_ONE +/– S NS, –* S 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS*AC_NONEX_SPECACCTG_ONE +/– NS, –* NS, –* S 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEPDIR_YRS *AC_INDEP_SPECACCTG_ONE +/– NS, –* NS, –* S 
ACAVGBODTEN_AC_DIRECTORS_YRS*AC_POTACCTG_ONE +/– S S S 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACNONEXDIR_YRS*AC_NONEXEC_POTACCTG_ONE +/– NS, –* S S 
ACAVGBODTEN_ACINDEP_YRS*AC_INDEP_POTACCTG_ONE +/– NS, –* S S 
S = Supported; NS = Not Supported  
*, **, and *** denote significance at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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 Contrary to expectations, at the board level neither bank work experience, bank 
director experience, nor either type of accounting expertise was effective in preventing 
bank failure (Hypotheses 1–4). In fact, with respect to bank work experience, the signs 
were positive and statistically significant in five instances, and negative—as expected—
in only one instance and never statistically significant. For bank director experience, the 
signs were surprisingly positive in six of nine instances and never statistically significant. 
Although significant results were not obtained with respect to either special or potential 
accounting experience in any period, the signs were as expected in 10 of 18 instances. 
With respect to the interaction effects of bank work experience, bank director experience, 
and the two categories of accounting expertise, statistically significant results were not 
observed for any period, although the signs were as expected in 12 of 18 cases.  
 All hypotheses that involve average board tenure were proposed in the null form 
due to conflicting theories with respect to the anticipated benefits associated with tenure. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that there would be no association between the tenure of directors 
on a bank‘s board and the likelihood of bank failure. The results reflect negative signs in 
all nine instances, and the results were statistically significant in six of those cases. Thus, 
these findings provide support for the idea that directors with longer tenure are associated 
with a lower likelihood of bank failure.  
 Despite the fact that bank work experience was not statistically significant in 
preventing bank failure (see Hypothesis 1), when bank work experience was allowed to 
interact with average board tenure (Hypothesis 6), an inverse relationship between the 
interaction term and bank failure was noted in all nine possible cases, and the results were  
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statistically significant in seven of nine cases. These findings suggest that bank work 
experience is beneficial in preventing bank failure only when the directors with bank 
work experience have served on the bank‘s board for relatively longer periods.  
 I also examine the interaction effects of average board tenure and the two 
categories of accounting expertise employed in this study and their impact on bank 
failure. The results with respect to SPECACCTG and board tenure were negative in only 
two of nine instances and never statistically significant. However, for the interaction of 
POTACCTG and board tenure, the signs were negative in all nine instances and 
statistically significant only for nonexecutive and independent directors and only in the 
year before failure. These findings indicate that only when nonexecutive and independent 
directors‘ potential accounting experience is combined with longer director tenure do the 
positive benefits accrue to the bank on whose boards they sit.  
 This study also investigated the relationships between bank work experience, 
bank director experience, and the two categories of accounting expertise possessed by 
members of the banks‘ audit committee and bank failure. For bank work experience, the 
signs were unexpectedly positive and statistically significant in all nine instances. For 
bank director experience, the signs were similarly positive in seven of nine instances but 
statistically significant in only one period—at the audit committee level one year prior to 
failure. For the audit committee–related POTACCTG variable, the signs were in the 
anticipated direction in all nine instances and statistically significant in five of nine cases. 
For SPECACCTG represented on the audit committee, the signs were unexpectedly 
positive in six of nine cases but never statistically significant. These results suggest that 
having audit committee directors with work experience as a chief financial officer, vice 
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president of finance, or controller is more effective in preventing bank failure than having 
audit committee members with the CPA designation or experience in public accounting.  
 With respect to the association between average tenure of directors on the audit 
committee and bank failure, the signs were negative in eight of nine instances. A 
statistically significant inverse relationship between tenure and bank failure was noted in 
three of nine cases; a statistically significant positive relationship between tenure and 
bank failure was noted in one instance. These results provide limited support for the 
expertise hypothesis, suggesting that directors do indeed gain bank-specific and industry-
specific knowledge over time that enables them to enhance their ability to meet their 
fiduciary responsibilities on behalf of the stockholders.  
 When average tenure of audit committee members was allowed to interact with 
bank work experience at the audit committee level, the interaction term was positively 
associated with bank failure in all nine cases and was statistically significant in three of 
those cases. These results provide additional support for the notion that directors 
possessing bank work experience on bank boards are not an effective deterrent to bank 
failure.  
 Finally, the power of director tenure is again apparent in the results obtained for 
the interactive effects of average tenure and the two types of accounting expertise 
possessed by audit committee members and their corresponding effects on bank failure. 
The signs were negative in all 18 cases and reached significance in 7 of 18 instances. 
While the results related to SPECACCTG and POTACCTG and bank failure reflected 
negative signs in 12 of 18 instances and statistical significance in 5 of 18 cases (see 
Hypothesis 10), once average tenure was allowed to interact with the two types of 
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accounting expertise, negative signs were obtained in all 18 cases and statistical 
significance was noted in 7 of 18 cases. These results provide additional support for the 
notion that directors with longer tenure are associated with a reduced likelihood of bank 
failure.  
Discussion  
 A central premise of this study was that the human capital that directors bring to 
oversight responsibilities and corporate strategy roles should be inversely related to bank 
failure. The specific elements of human capital of interest were previous commercial 
bank work experience, director experience, and two categories of accounting expertise 
employed in previous academic research. In general, my findings do not provide support 
for many of the hypotheses and, in many cases, the actual signs were in the unpredicted 
direction. There are a number of potential explanations for these findings.  
 First, although I could determine from their biographies included in the banks‘ 
Form DEF 14A statements whether or not a director had previous bank work experience 
or previous or contemporaneous bank director experience, in most cases it was not 
possible to capture the duration of the bank employment relationship or the bank 
directorship. It is possible that the directors were not employed or did not serve as 
directors for a sufficiently long enough period to begin to reap the human capital benefits 
of those experiences. It may be that banks, in their efforts to put their directors in the best 
possible light for stockholders, could have emphasized in director bios what senior 
management deemed to be desirable relevant industry experience even when such 
experience was not long in duration. Future research into these issues could address the 
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duration of such relationships in order to determine if there is a minimum level of service 
necessary for the banks to realize the benefits related to these director experiences.  
 Second, I did not attempt to assess the quality of the experience of the directors 
who possessed bank work experience and/or bank directorships. Although many of the 
director bios included the names of the banks that had employed the directors or on 
whose boards their directors had served, I made no attempt to determine whether those 
banks survived or failed during the latest wave of bank failures. Experience, either as an 
employee or as a director, with a poorly managed bank with a risky business strategy 
clearly would not be as beneficial to the director as experience with a well-run bank with 
a properly diversified loan portfolio and reasonable business strategy.  
 Third, a recent study by Almandoz and Tilcsik (2013) provides intriguing insights 
into the human capital dimension of bank directors—especially those with bank work 
experience. In a study of 457 commercial and savings banks established between 1996 
and 2000, the authors hypothesize and find support for the idea that directors with 
experience working in the banking industry as well as real estate professionals may 
indeed prove to be liabilities instead of assets when their banks are involved in ―risk-
fraught activities.‖ Specifically, the study uses a bank‘s asset growth rate and a relatively 
high proportion of real estate loans in the bank‘s loan portfolio as proxies for risk-fraught 
activities and finds that banks with higher proportions of domain experts (experience as 
bankers or as real estate professionals) were more likely to fail by the end of 2012 than 
were banks with lower proportions of these experts on their boards. The authors theorize 
that their findings are attributable to expert overconfidence and cognitive entrenchment: 
―One well-documented and potentially problematic tendency of experts is overconfidence 
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in the accuracy of their professional judgment and predictions, which may in turn foster 
undue risk-taking or imprudent organizational decisions‖ (p. 6). Dane (2010) defines 
cognitive entrenchment as a high degree of stability in a person‘s domain schemas. While 
such stability may be desirable in many cases, it may also have undesirable consequences 
as domain expertise grows: ―As one acquires domain expertise, one loses flexibility with 
regard to problem solving, adaptation, and creative idea generation‖ (Dane, 2010, p. 582). 
Thus, domain experts may become wedded to their initial decisions or evaluations and 
ignore new information that suggests their initial judgments were inaccurate. Clearly, the 
findings of the Almandoz and Tilcsik study help explain the counterintuitive results of 
this study.  
 Another ironic finding of the current study is that directors with experience as a 
chief financial officer, vice president of finance, or controller (POTACCTG) were more 
beneficial to the banks on whose boards they sat than were directors who were CPAs or 
who had worked in public accounting (SPECACCTG). It may be that the directors 
possessing the SPECACCTG background were more focused on the accounting-related 
aspects of their roles as directors (overseeing the relationship with the external auditors, 
working with the internal audit function, ensuring that the bank‘s tax positions were 
reasonable, etc.) than they were with assessing the adequacy of the bank‘s loan portfolio 
diversification policies, providing oversight with respect to market expansion and bank 
acquisitions, etc. An argument could be made that assessing the big picture for the bank 
is more in the job requirements of chief financial officers and vice presidents of finance 
than is typically expected of CPAs and those employed in public accounting. Future 
research should be directed at trying to ferret out the circumstances under which and the 
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reasons why directors with a POTACCTG background appear to contribute more to their 
banks‘ survivability than do directors with a SPECACCTG background.  
 This study‘s results with respect to the tenure of directors on the board as well as 
those on the audit committee generally provide support for the expertise hypothesis—the 
idea that directors‘ ability to meet their oversight responsibilities and to set reasonable 
corporate policies and objectives is enhanced as the directors gain industry-specific 
knowledge during their tenure as directors. Therefore, banking regulators and others with 
an interest in the corporate governance of commercial banks would be well advised not to 
limit the tenure of bank directors, as the human capital of these directors improves over 
time and strengthens the survivability of their banks. However, future research is needed 
to determine if there is a point at which longer board service no longer benefits the bank. 
Future research could also address whether the findings with respect to tenure are 
applicable across all sizes of banks or whether the findings are relevant only to banks of a 
certain size.  
Limitations  
As is the case with any research, there are limitations associated with this study. 
One such shortcoming is that the current research is a study of association and not 
causation. Second, even though I tried to design the research so as to control for a large 
number of variables, the possibility remains that omitted correlated variables could 
explain the results. A third limitation typical of studies relying on biographical 
information is that the results are dependent on the accuracy and completeness of the 
director information provided by firms in their DEF 14A filings with the SEC. Also, 
while this study‘s focus on the commercial banking industry in the United States 
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eliminates the need to control for interindustry differences, by concentrating on a single 
industry the study‘s results may not be generalizable to other businesses.  
The matched-pairs design of this study results in additional limitations. Although 
I attempted to find a suitable matching nonfailed bank for each failed bank in the sample 
based on the matching criteria discussed earlier, a close match on each of the criteria was 
not possible in every instance. It is also possible that in instances in which there are 
multiple potential matching banks, the selection of one bank over another could have 
affected my results. Another limitation is that the current study focuses on SEC 
registrants and, therefore, the results may not be generalizable to private, nonlisted banks. 
Moreover, as a result of the financial crisis, the sample period (2008–2011) was 
characterized by relatively rapid deterioration in economic conditions in much of the 
country; thus, the study‘s results may not be generalizable to periods of less-challenging 
economic circumstances. Finally, given that boards and their subcommittees conduct 
their activities in private, it is impossible to ascertain the level of influence of individual 
directors on their boards‘ deliberative processes. For instance, it is possible that directors 
(on the board or the audit committee) possessing banking experience and/or accounting 
expertise may not have the appropriate interpersonal skills to enable them to adequately 
influence the other board members—thereby negating the positive effects of the 
directors‘ experience and expertise. It is also possible that some boards—especially in 
smaller banks—are tightly controlled by one or more dominant directors who have the 
power to ignore the advice and guidance provided by other directors. These limitations 
open up several opportunities for future research. 
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